

From: Andrew Christy, ACLU-PA
Re: Reducing or waiving costs post-sentencing
Date: Updated September 10, 2019

MEMORANDUM

Some trial courts believe that they lack the authority to reduce or waive costs. However, a closer look at 42 Pa.C.S. § 9728 and Pennsylvania Rule of Criminal Procedure 706(C) shows that courts have precisely that authority, and we believe that such authority exists indefinitely.

An important starting point is that court costs “are not part of the criminal’s sentence but are merely incident to the judgment.” *Commonwealth v. Rivera*, 95 A.3d 913, 916 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2014). Unlike a fine, costs are not punishment and are more “akin to collateral consequences.” *Id.* See also *Commonwealth v. Nicely*, 638 A.2d 213, 217 (Pa. 1994) (“The imposition of costs in a criminal case is not part of the sentence, but rather is incident to the judgment.”). This means that jurisdictional limits on the modification of “sentences” do not come into play when considering a reduction in court costs.

A. Trial courts have authority to reduce or waive court costs.

Costs are assessed automatically upon conviction, but our legislature and Supreme Court have given trial courts the authority to reduce or waive them. That authority is stated explicitly in the applicable statutes and Rule. 42 Pa.C.S. § 9728(b.2) provides that defendants are “liable for costs, as provided in section 9721(c.1), unless the court determines otherwise pursuant to Pa.R.Crim.P. No. 706(C).” Rule 706(C), in turn, provides that “the court, in determining the *amount* and method of payment of a fine *or costs* shall, insofar as is just and practicable, consider the burden upon the defendant by reason of the defendant’s financial means” (emphasis added).¹ The plain language of Rule 706(C), thus, directs courts to tailor the total amount of costs based on the defendant’s financial resources.²

The legislative history confirms the intent of the legislature to permit courts to reduce or waive costs based on indigence when it enacted § 9728(b.2) in 2010. As the legislative history explains, those statutes were intended to allow the “sentencing court” to “retain all discretion to *modify or even waive costs* in an appropriate case.” Pennsylvania House of Representatives Judiciary Committee, SB 1169 Bill Analysis (Sept. 15, 2010) PN 2181 (emphasis added). Such legislative intent reflects the reality that indigent defendants simply cannot afford to pay anything more than

¹ The phrase “in determining the amount and method of payment of a” fine or cost in Rule 706(C) is a term of art that refers to determining the *total amount* that the defendant owes. The same language is in 42 Pa.C.S. § 9726(d) (addressing fines), and case law is clear that it refers to the total amount that is owed, not the payment plan requiring specific monthly installments. See, e.g., *Commonwealth v. Croll*, 480 A.2d 266, 275-76 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1984) (§ 9726(c) and (d) require that a court consider the defendant’s ability to pay the entire fine). It originates in Section 7.02 of the 1962 Model Penal Code. By contrast, Rule 706(B) governs payment plans.

² A court’s authority under Rule 706(C) is not limited to proceedings after a defendant defaults on his payments, something governed by subsections (A) and (D). Instead, it applies when a court is asked to consider the total amount of fines and costs that a defendant should owe. See *Commonwealth v. Martin*, 335 A.2d 424, 425-26 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1976) (en banc) (trial court erred by imposing a fine without considering the defendant’s ability to pay, as required by Rule 706(C) (previously 1407)).

nominal costs, and the court is given the power to avoid assigning defendants unaffordable financial obligations. In light of these statutory amendments, and their cross-reference to Rule 706(C), no costs are mandatory if the trial court determines that the defendant cannot afford them.³

B. A trial court's authority to reduce or waive costs is not limited to sentencing.

As is noted above, costs are not a part of the sentence. As a result, the 30-day jurisdictional limit in 42 Pa.C.S. § 5505 to modify the sentencing order does not apply to court costs. For example, the Commonwealth Court has explained that when a defendant challenges the clerk of court's imposition of certain costs after the appeal period has run, "[s]uch a challenge is properly brought in the sentencing court." *Commonwealth v. Williams*, 909 A.2d 419, 421 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2006). In *Williams*, the defendant originally brought a challenge to certain costs in the trial court three years after his conviction, and the trial court dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. The Commonwealth Court reversed, ruling that the trial court is the proper forum for such a claim. Similarly, in *Fordyce v. Clerk of Courts*, the Commonwealth Court explained that it had transferred a petition for a writ of mandamus to the trial court because it had "exclusive jurisdiction" over the costs matter even though the time to appeal had already passed; when the case returned on appeal, the court ultimately invalidated the challenged costs. 869 A.2d 1049, 1050 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2005).

Such decisions are consistent with the statutory framework created by Act 96 of 2010. In 42 Pa.C.S. §§ 9721(c.1) and 9728(b.2), that Act addressed two separate procedures: § 9721(c.1) governs costs at sentencing, and § 9728(b.2) addresses costs that are being collected. Section 9721(c.1) provides:

(c.1) Mandatory payment of costs.--Notwithstanding the provisions of section 9728 (relating to collection of restitution, reparation, fees, costs, fines and penalties) or any provision of law to the contrary, in addition to the alternatives set forth in subsection (a), the court shall order the defendant to pay costs. In the event the court fails to issue an order for costs pursuant to section 9728, costs shall be imposed upon the defendant under this section. No court order shall be necessary for the defendant to incur liability for costs under this section. The provisions of this subsection do not alter the court's discretion under Pa.R.Crim.P. No. 706(C) (relating to fines or costs).

This provision solely addresses *sentencing orders* because § 9721 is all about sentencing. This provision directs that a defendant is liable for costs even if the court does not include them in an order. Nonetheless, the court still has discretion under Rule 706(C) to reduce or waive costs based on ability to pay.

But while § 9721(c.1) is focused on sentencing, the other statutory amendment in 42 Pa.C.S. § 9728(b.2) is focused on subsequent proceedings. Section 9728 is titled "Collection of restitution,

³ For a discussion of a trial court's authority to waive otherwise "mandatory" costs if it finds that the defendant is unable to afford to pay them, please consult the ACLU of Pennsylvania's separate memorandum "Reducing or waiving costs at sentencing," available at www.aclupa.org/finesandcosts.

reparation, fees, costs, fines and penalties” and it discusses exactly that: *collections* and the procedures that occur *after* sentencing. It addresses the procedures used to collect fines, costs, and restitution, something that naturally happens well after sentencing and often takes years or decades. Section 9728(b.2) provides:

(b.2) Mandatory payment of costs.--Notwithstanding any provision of law to the contrary, in the event the court fails to issue an order under subsection (a) imposing costs upon the defendant, the defendant shall nevertheless be liable for costs, as provided in section 9721(c.1), unless the court determines otherwise pursuant to Pa.R.Crim.P. No. 706(C) (relating to fines or costs). The absence of a court order shall not affect the applicability of the provisions of this section.

Logically, § 9728(b.2) must mean something different than § 9721(c.1). If they were both merely intended to make defendants liable for court costs even if the court does not impose those court costs, then § 9728(b.2) would be duplicative and would have no separate meaning. It would be a nullity. *See* 1 Pa.C.S. § 1921(a) (“Every statute shall be construed, if possible, to give effect to all its provisions”); *Commonwealth v. Velez*, 51 A.3d 260, 265 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2012) (“Basic rules of statutory construction set forth that statutes ‘shall be construed, if possible, to give effect to all its provisions’ and that the ‘legislature did not intend any statutory language to exist as mere surplusage.’”).

Instead, the appropriate reading is that § 9721 governs sentencing and § 9728 governs collections down the road. This is evident from the statutory structure and the way that each of those provisions operates. Accordingly, when the General Assembly specifically discussed the courts’ authority under Rule 706(C) both at sentencing (§ 9721(c.1)) and later, during collections proceedings (§ 9728(b.2)), it intended for courts to be able to exercise that Rule 706(C) discretion during both phases of a case. Such an interpretation is the only way to give a distinct meaning to each statute.

Finally, nothing in Rule 706(C) limits its application to any particular time. By its plain text, it applies “when” the court “determine[s] the amount and method of payment of a fine or costs.” Rule 706(C). That is the same language used in 706(B), which governs payment plans: “When the court determines, after hearing, that the defendant is without the financial means to pay . . .” Rule 706(B). Both provisions have no temporal limit, and in both cases there is no prohibition against a defendant petitioning a court for relief. In fact, *nothing* in the text of Rule 706(C) limits its application to the time of sentencing. Of course, it reasonably applies at sentencing, as that is certainly one time that the court will “determin[e]” how much the defendant should pay. But on its face, there is no bar to a defendant asking a court to make such a determination down the road, such as when a defendant asks the court to reduce the total amount of costs.