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LEAGUE OF WOMEN VOTERS OF PENNSYLVANIA, LORRAINE HAW, AND RONALD L. GREENBLATT,

ESQUIRE,

Petitioners,

v.

KATHY BOOCKVAR, THE ACTING SECRETARY OF THE COMMONWEALTH, SHAMEEKAH MOORE, MARTIN VICKLESS, KRISTIN JUNE IRWIN, AND KELLY WILLIAMS,

Respondents.

COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

ORIGINAL JURISDICTION

No. 578 MD 2019

PETITIONERS' APPLICATION FOR SUMMARY RELIEF AND ENTRY OF JUDGMENT UNDER PA. R.A.P. 1532(b)

Petitioners the League of Women Voters and Lorraine Haw (together, "Petitioners"), by and through their counsel, respectfully move pursuant to Rule 1532(b) of the Pennsylvania Rules of Appellate Procedure for summary relief and

entry of a judgment declaring the proposed amendment in Joint Resolution 2019-1 (the "Proposed Amendment") unconstitutional and void. In support of their Application, Petitioners incorporate herein their accompanying brief and the attached exhibits.

BACKGROUND

1. Petitioners allege that the Proposed Amendment included on the November 5, 2019 general election ballot violates the constitutional mandate in Article XI, § 1 of the Pennsylvania Constitution which provides that: "When two or more amendments shall be submitted they shall be voted upon separately." Pa. Const. art. XI, § 1. Article XI, § 1 "insures that the voters will 'be able to express their will as to each substantive constitutional change separately." Pa. Prison Soc'y v. Commonwealth, 776 A.2d 971, 976 (Pa. 2001) (quoting Pa. Prison Soc'y v. Commonwealth, 727 A.2d 632, 634 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1999)). Because the November 2019 ballot question proposes several amendments to Pennsylvania's Constitution, but allows voters only a single "yes" or "no" vote, it violates Article XI, § 1's separate-vote requirement and the electorate's right to vote. Compounding this problem, the text of the proposed constitutional amendment was not on the ballot; instead, the voters were asked to vote "yes" or "no" to a brief and incomplete summary of the proposed changes.

- 2. The challenged ballot question asks voters to adopt or reject the proposed constitutional amendment known as Joint Resolution 2019-1, which would add a new section 9.1 to Article I of the Pennsylvania Constitution. The new section would create fifteen new constitutional rights for crime victims that must be enforced to the same degree as the constitutional rights of the accused in criminal court proceedings. The Proposed Amendment would allow victims or prosecutors to seek a court order to enforce these constitutional rights, and, additionally, would empower the General Assembly to pass laws to define and implement these new rights.
- 3. These new rights would significantly change many of the fundamental rights now provided to the accused, including those set forth in Article I, § 9 ("Rights of accused in criminal prosecutions"), Article I, § 10 ("No person shall, for the same offense, be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb"), Article I, § 14 ("Prisoners to be bailable; habeas corpus"), and Article V, § 9 ("Right of appeal"). In addition, they would affect the public's right of access to court proceedings set forth in Article I, § 11; the governor's power to pardon, set forth in Article IV, § 9; and the Supreme Court's authority over court proceedings, set forth in Article V § 10 ("Judicial administration"), and jurisdiction over appeals, set forth in the Schedule to the Judiciary Article. Thus, the Proposed Amendment encompasses multiple subject matters that affect many different existing provisions in the Pennsylvania Constitution.

- 4. Petitioner the League of Women Voters is a nationwide, nonpartisan grassroots organization of women and men who believe that through informed action, people can make profound changes in their communities. Pet. for Review ¶ 5. The League of Women Voters of Pennsylvania ("the League") is the state chapter of the League of Women Voters. Id. The League encourages informed and active participation in government, works to increase understanding of major public policy issues, and influences public policy through education and advocacy. *Id.* ¶ 6. The League frequently takes positions on issues such as voting and election reforms, criminal justice reform, fair funding for education, environmental protection, and more. *Id.* ¶ 7. The League and the members it represents have a substantial, direct, and immediate interest in this case, because the challenged ballot question threatens to deprive the voters of the Commonwealth of their right to decide what changes to make to their Constitution. *Id.* \P 9.
- 5. Petitioner Lorraine Haw is a resident and registered voter in the Commonwealth. Id. ¶ 10. Ms. Haw agrees with parts of the Proposed Amendment—like considering the safety of victims and their families at bail hearings. Id. ¶ 16. But she is opposed to the parts of the amendment that she believes will take away rights from defendants. Id. Ms. Haw could not vote for the parts of the amendment she agrees with without voting for other things she disagrees with.

She wanted to be able to vote separately on each change to the Constitution, as is her right. *Id.* ¶ 17.

History of the Ballot Question

- 6. The Pennsylvania Constitution mandates that the Pennsylvania electorate vote on all proposed amendments to the Pennsylvania Constitution and that each ballot question contain only one amendment: "[S]uch proposed amendment or amendments shall be submitted to the qualified electors of the State. When two or more amendments shall be submitted they shall be voted upon separately." Pa. Const. art. XI, § 1.
- 7. On November 5, 2019, the Secretary of the Commonwealth included on the election ballot a single-spaced, 73-word question that would make sweeping changes to the Pennsylvania Constitution:

Shall the Pennsylvania Constitution be amended to grant certain rights to crime victims, including to be treated with fairness, respect and dignity; considering their safety in bail proceedings; timely notice and opportunity to take part in public proceedings; reasonable protection from the accused; right to refuse discovery requests made by the accused; restitution and return of property; proceedings free from delay; and to be informed of these rights, so they can enforce them?

Pa. Dept. of State website (attached hereto as Exhibit A). This Proposed Amendment would add at least fifteen new rights to the Pennsylvania Constitution and amend three articles, eight sections, and one schedule of the existing

Pennsylvania Constitution. Including these many amendments in one ballot question violated the plain requirements of Article XI, § 1.

- 8. During the 2019 legislative session, SB 1011 was introduced under the name House Bill 276 (H.B. 276) and passed by the House in April 2019. H.B. 276 (2019) (attached hereto as Exhibit B). In June 2019, the Senate passed H.B. 276 under the name Senate Bill 149, also known as Joint Resolution 2019-1 (the "Joint Resolution" or the "Proposed Amendment"). S.B. 149 (2019) (attached hereto as Exhibit C). Joint Resolution 2019-1 directed the Secretary of the Commonwealth to submit the proposed amendment to the electorate.
- 9. The Attorney General of the Commonwealth prepared a Plain English statement pursuant to 25 Pa. Stat. Ann. § 2621.1. The Secretary of the Commonwealth drafted the text of the single ballot question that presented the Proposed Amendment to the voters. Ex. A. The Secretary published the ballot question, the Attorney General's Plain English Statement, and Joint Resolution 2019-1 together on the Department of State website. *Id*.
- 10. The ballot question appeared on the ballot in the November 5, 2019 general election. Voters were not presented with the language of the actual amendment to the Pennsylvania Constitution. Instead, they voted on the condensed ballot question prepared by the Secretary of the Commonwealth.

Procedural History

- 11. Petitioners commenced this action on October 10, 2019 by filing a verified Petition for Review under this Court's original jurisdiction. Oct. 10, 2019 Pet. for Review.
- 12. The Petition to Review raised three counts against Kathy Boockvar, the Acting Secretary of the Commonwealth (the "Secretary" or "Respondent"): 1) the Ballot Question violates the requirement of Article XI, § 1 of the Pennsylvania Constitution that "when two or more amendments shall be submitted they shall be voted upon separately"; 2) the Ballot Question violates Article XI, § 1's requirement that a "proposed amendment or amendments shall be submitted to the qualified electors of the State"; and 3) in the alternative, the Ballot Question violates the electorate's right to be fully informed of the question to be voted on because it does not fairly, accurately, and clearly apprise voters of the issue. *Id.* ¶¶ 34-54. Petitioners seek to have the Proposed Amendment declared unconstitutional and void.
- 13. Veteran criminal defense attorney Ronald Greenblatt ("Greenblatt") intervened in support of the Petition for Review. Oct. 18, 2019 App. for Leave to Intervene. Shameekah Moore, Martin Vickless, Kristin June Irwin, and Kelly Williams intervened in opposition to the Petition for Review. Oct. 17, 2019 App. for Leave to Intervene. Both applications were granted. Oct. 22, 2019 Order.

- 14. Petitioners immediately moved for a preliminary injunction. After expedited briefing and a hearing, the Court issued a Memorandum Opinion and Order on October 30, 2019, granting a preliminary injunction enjoining the Secretary from tabulating and certifying the votes of the November 2019 general election on the ballot question. The Court found that all requirements for a preliminary injunction had been met, including that Petitioners "raised substantial questions" as to the constitutionality of the Proposed Amendment and "are likely to prevail on the merits" with respect to their various claims and that the proposed ballot question would immediately and irreparably harm accused individuals, victims, and the criminal justice system as a whole. Oct. 30, 2019 Order & Mem. at 21.1
- 15. In her opinion, Judge Ceisler concluded that "the Proposed constitutional Amendment presented by the November 2019 ballot question (1) appears to contain multiple changes to the Constitution because it provides a whole series of new and mutually independent rights to victims of crimes, and (2) may amend multiple existing constitutional articles and sections across multiple subject matters." *Id.* at 29. She also found that "the Proposed Amendment addresses a wide range of subject matters including bail, discovery, due process, restitution, the right

The Commonwealth Court granted Petitioners' Emergency Application to Lift Supersedeas on November 2, 2019 and lifted the automatic supersedeas during Respondent's appeal to the Pennsylvania Supreme Court. Nov. 2, 2019 Order.

to privacy, and evidence control, all under the auspices of connecting them to victims' rights." *Id.* at 33. Because of this, "the competing rights established in the Proposed Amendment are clearly *not so interrelated as to justify inclusion into a single subject." <i>Id.* (emphasis in original).

- 16. The Secretary and the Intervening Respondents appealed the grant of preliminary injunction to the Pennsylvania Supreme Court. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court affirmed the preliminary injunction against Respondent on November 4, 2019. Nov. 4, 2019 Supreme Court Order. As a result, the Secretary of the Commonwealth was and remains barred from tabulating the votes on the Proposed Amendment or certifying the November 5, 2019 election results on the Proposed Amendment until this Court makes its final merits determination.
- 17. Upon remand of the case to the Commonwealth Court, the Secretary and Intervening Respondents filed Answers and New Matter. Nov. 12, 2019 Answer and New Matter of Respondent; Nov. 12, 2019 Answer and New Matter of Respondent Party Intervenors. Petitioners responded with their Replies to New Matter, and the pleadings are now closed. The parties stipulated to a schedule for summary relief briefing and submitted a Joint Application for approval of that schedule, which the Court granted on December 4, 2019. Dec. 4, 2019 Order.

SUMMARY RELIEF

- 18. Petitioners move this Court for an Order declaring (1) that the constitutional amendment proposed by Joint Resolution 2019-1 and the November 2019 ballot question violates the requirement of Article XI, § 1 of the Pennsylvania Constitution that "when two or more amendments shall be submitted they shall be voted upon separately," (2) that the proposed amendment substantively and facially affects, and therefore amends, more than one part of the Constitution, (3) that the form of the ballot question violates Article XI, § 1 because it does not set forth the text of the proposed amendment, and (4) that the form of the ballot question violates Article XI, § 1 because it does not fairly accurately, and clearly apprise voters of the issue to be voted on.
- 19. Petitioners hereby incorporate the legal arguments and points and authorities set forth in their Brief submitted in support of this Application.

WHEREFORE, for all of the foregoing reasons, Petitioners respectfully request that this Honorable Court grant their Application for Summary Relief and enter an order declaring the Proposed Amendment unconstitutional and void.

Respectfully submitted,

Date: December 13, 2019

/s/ Steven E. Bizar

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/s/ Mary Catherine Roper

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Attorneys for Petitioners League of Women Voters of Pennsylvania and Lorraine Haw

CERTIFICATION

I certify that this filing complies with the provisions of the *Public Access*Policy of the Unified Judicial System of Pennsyvlania: Case Records of the

Appellate and Trial Courts that require filing confidential information and documents differently than non-confidential information and documents.

Date: December 13, 2019 /s/ Tiffany E. Engsell

Tiffany E. Engsell (Pa. 320711)

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I, Tiffany E. Engsell, hereby certify that on December 13, 2019, I caused a

true and correct copy of the foregoing document titled Petitioners' Application for

Summary Relief, together with all supporting materials thereto, be served via

electronic filing to all counsel of record.

Date: December 13, 2019

/s/ Tiffany E. Engsell

Tiffany E. Engsell (Pa. 320711)

LEAGUE OF WOMEN VOTERS OF PENNSYLVANIA, LORRAINE HAW, AND RONALD L. GREENBLATT, ESQUIRE,

COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

Petitioners,

ORIGINAL JURISDICTION

v.

No. 578 MD 2019

KATHY BOOCKVAR, THE ACTING SECRETARY OF THE COMMONWEALTH, SHAMEEKAH MOORE, MARTIN VICKLESS, KRISTIN JUNE IRWIN, AND KELLY WILLIAMS,

Respondents.

ORDER GRANTING PETITIONERS' APPLICATION FOR SUMMARY RELIEF

AND NOW, this day of , 2019, upon consideration of

Petitioners' Application for Summary Relief, it is hereby **ORDERED** that said Application is **GRANTED**.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the constitutional amendment proposed by Joint Resolution 2019-1 is **DECLARED** unconstitutional and void.

BY THE COURT:

EXHIBIT A

Ballot Question

Shall the Pennsylvania Constitution be amended to grant certain rights to crime victims, including to be treated with fairness, respect and dignity; considering their safety in bail proceedings; timely notice and opportunity to take part in public proceedings; reasonable protection from the accused; right to refuse discovery requests made by the accused; restitution and return of property; proceedings free from delay; and to be informed of these rights, so they can enforce them?

Plain English Statement of the Office of Attorney General

The proposed amendment, if approved by the electorate, will add a new section to Article I of the Pennsylvania Constitution. That amendment will provide victims of crimes with certain, new constitutional rights that must be protected in the same way as the rights afforded to individuals accused of committing a crime.

The proposed amendment defines "victim" as both a person against whom the criminal act was committed and any person who was directly harmed by it. The accused or any person a court decides is not acting in the best interest of a victim cannot be a victim.

Generally, the proposed amendment would grant victims the constitutional right to receive notice and be present and speak at public proceedings involving the alleged criminal conduct. It would also grant victims the constitutional right to receive notice of any escape or release of the accused and the right to have their safety and the safety of their family considered in setting the amount of bail and other release conditions. It would also create several other new constitutional rights, such as the right to timely restitution and return of property, the right to refuse to answer questions asked by the accused, and the right to speak with a government attorney.

Specifically, the proposed amendment would establish the following new rights for victims:

To be treated with fairness and respect for the victim's safety, dignity and privacy

To have the safety of the victim and the victim's family considered in fixing the amount of bail and release conditions for the accused

To reasonable and timely notice of and to be present at all public proceedings involving the criminal or delinquent conduct

To be notified of any pretrial disposition of the case

With the exception of grand jury proceedings, to be heard in any proceeding where a right of the victim is implicated, including, but not limited to, release, plea, sentencing, disposition, parole and pardon

To be notified of all parole procedures, to participate in the parole process, to provide information to be considered before the parole of the offender, and to be notified of the parole of the offender. To reasonable protection from the accused or any person acting on behalf of the accused. To reasonable notice of any release or escape of the accused.

To refuse an interview, deposition or other discovery request made by the accused or any person acting on behalf of the accused

Full and timely restitution from the person or entity convicted for the unlawful conduct

Full and timely restitution as determined by the court in a juvenile delinquency proceeding

To the prompt return of property when no longer needed as evidence

To proceedings free from unreasonable delay and a prompt and final conclusion of the case and any related postconviction proceedings

To confer with the attorney for the government

To be informed of all rights enumerated in this section

The proposed amendment would allow a victim or prosecutor to ask a court to enforce these constitutional rights but would not allow a victim to become a legal party to the criminal proceeding or sue the Commonwealth or any political subdivision, such as a county or municipality, for monetary damages.

Once added to the Pennsylvania Constitution, these specific rights of victims cannot be eliminated, except by a judicial decision finding all or part of the amendment unconstitutional or the approval of a subsequent constitutional amendment. If approved, the General Assembly may pass a law to implement these new, constitutional rights, but it may not pass a law eliminating them. If approved, State and local governments will need to create new procedures to ensure that victims receive the rights provided for by the amendment.

Joint Resolution NO. 2019-1

Proposing an amendment to the Constitution of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, providing for rights of victims of crime.

The General Assembly of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania hereby resolves as follows:

Section 1. The following amendment to the Constitution of Pennsylvania is proposed in accordance with Article XI:

That Article I be amended by adding a section to read:

§ 9.1. Rights of victims of crime.

(a) To secure for victims justice and due process throughout the criminal and juvenile justice systems, a victim shall have the following rights, as further provided and as defined by the General Assembly, which shall be protected in a manner no less vigorous than the rights afforded to the accused: to be treated with fairness and respect for the victim's safety, dignity and privacy; to have the safety of the victim and the victim's family considered in fixing the amount of bail and releaseconditions for the accused; to reasonable and timely notice of and to be present at all public proceedings involving the criminal or delinquent conduct; to be notified of any pretrial disposition of the case; with the exception of grand jury proceedings, to be heard in any proceeding where a right of the victim is implicated, including, but not limited to, release, plea, sentencing, disposition, parole and pardon; to be notified of all parole procedures, to participate in the parole process, to provide information to be considered before the parole of the offender, and to be notified of the parole of the offender; to reasonable protection from the accused or any person acting on behalf of the accused; to reasonable notice of any release or escape of the accused; to refuse an interview, deposition or other discovery request made by the accused or any person acting on behalf of the accused; full and timely restitution from the person or entity convicted for the unlawful conduct; full and timely restitution as determined by the court in a juvenile delinquency proceeding; to the prompt return of property when no longer needed as evidence; to proceedings free from unreasonable delay and a prompt and final conclusion of the case and anyrelated postconviction proceedings; to confer with the attorney for the government; and to be informed of all rights enumerated in this section.

https://www.dos.pa.gov/VotingElections/CandidatesCommittees/RunningforOffice/Pages/Joint-Resolution-2019-1.aspx

- (b) The victim or the attorney for the government upon request of the victim may assert in any trial or appellate court, or before any other authority, with jurisdiction over the case, and have enforced, the rights enumerated in this section and any other right afforded to the victim by law. This section does not grant the victim party status or create any cause of action for compensation or damages against the Commonwealth or any political subdivision, nor any officer, employee or agent of the Commonwealth or any political subdivision, or any officer or employee of the court.
- (c) As used in this section and as further defined by the General Assembly, the term "victim" includes any person against whom the criminal offense or delinquent act is committed or who is directly harmed by the commission of the offense or act. Theterm "victim" does not include the accused or a person whom the court finds would not act in the best interests of a deceased, incompetent, minor or incapacitated victim.
- Section 2. (a) Upon the first passage by the General Assembly of this proposed constitutional amendment, the Secretary of the Commonwealth shall proceed immediately to comply with the advertising requirements of section 1 of Article XI of the Constitution of Pennsylvania and shall transmit the required advertisements to two newspapers in every county in which such newspapers are published in sufficient time after passage of this proposed constitutional amendment.
- (b) Upon the second passage by the General Assembly of this proposed constitutional amendment, the Secretary of the Commonwealth shall proceed immediately to comply with the advertising requirements of section 1 of Article XI of the Constitution of Pennsylvania and shall transmit the required advertisements to two newspapers in every county in which such newspapers are published in sufficient time after passage of this proposed constitutional amendment. The Secretary of the Commonwealth shall submit this proposed constitutional amendment to the qualified electors of this Commonwealth at the first primary, general or municipal election which meets the requirements of and is in conformance with section 1 of Article XI of the Constitution of Pennsylvania and which occurs at least three months after the proposed constitutional amendment is passed by the General Assembly.

EXHIBIT B

THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY OF PENNSYLVANIA

HOUSE BILL

No. 276

Session of 2019

INTRODUCED BY DELOZIER, BENNINGHOFF, BARRAR, BERNSTINE, BIZZARRO, BOBACK, CALTAGIRONE, COMITTA, COOK, CUTLER, T. DAVIS, DIGIROLAMO, ECKER, EVERETT, FARRY, FLYNN, FRITZ, GLEIM, GREGORY, HERSHEY, HICKERNELL, HILL-EVANS, KAUFFMAN, KEEFER, KLUNK, KORTZ, MALONEY, MATZIE, MCNEILL, MIZGORSKI, MURT, NELSON, OBERLANDER, ORTITAY, PASHINSKI, PICKETT, RAVENSTAHL, READSHAW, RYAN, SAYLOR, SCHLOSSBERG, STRUZZI, TOEPEL, TOOHIL, TOPPER, ZIMMERMAN, KINSEY AND ROZZI, FEBRUARY 1, 2019

REFERRED TO COMMITTEE ON JUDICIARY, FEBRUARY 1, 2019

A JOINT RESOLUTION

- Proposing an amendment to the Constitution of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, providing for rights of victims of crime.
- 3 The General Assembly of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania
- 4 hereby resolves as follows:
- 5 Section 1. The following amendment to the Constitution of
- 6 Pennsylvania is proposed in accordance with Article XI:
- 7 That Article I be amended by adding a section to read:
- 8 § 9.1. Rights of victims of crime.
- 9 (a) To secure for victims justice and due process throughout
- 10 the criminal and juvenile justice systems, a victim shall have
- 11 the following rights, as further provided and as defined by the
- 12 General Assembly, which shall be protected in a manner no less
- 13 vigorous than the rights afforded to the accused: to be treated
- 14 with fairness and respect for the victim's safety, dignity and

- 1 privacy; to have the safety of the victim and the victim's
- 2 family considered in fixing the amount of bail and release
- 3 conditions for the accused; to reasonable and timely notice of
- 4 and to be present at all public proceedings involving the
- 5 <u>criminal or delinquent conduct; to be notified of any pretrial</u>
- 6 <u>disposition of the case; with the exception of grand jury</u>
- 7 proceedings, to be heard in any proceeding where a right of the
- 8 <u>victim is implicated, including, but not limited to, release,</u>
- 9 plea, sentencing, disposition, parole and pardon; to be notified
- 10 of all parole procedures, to participate in the parole process,
- 11 to provide information to be considered before the parole of the
- 12 offender, and to be notified of the parole of the offender; to
- 13 <u>reasonable protection from the accused or any person acting on</u>
- 14 behalf of the accused; to reasonable notice of any release or
- 15 escape of the accused; to refuse an interview, deposition or
- 16 other discovery request made by the accused or any person acting
- 17 on behalf of the accused; full and timely restitution from the
- 18 person or entity convicted for the unlawful conduct; full and
- 19 timely restitution as determined by the court in a juvenile
- 20 delinguency proceeding; to the prompt return of property when no
- 21 longer needed as evidence; to proceedings free from unreasonable
- 22 delay and a prompt and final conclusion of the case and any
- 23 <u>related postconviction proceedings; to confer with the attorney</u>
- 24 for the government; and to be informed of all rights enumerated
- 25 in this section.
- 26 (b) The victim or the attorney for the government upon
- 27 request of the victim may assert in any trial or appellate
- 28 court, or before any other authority, with jurisdiction over the
- 29 case, and have enforced, the rights enumerated in this section
- 30 and any other right afforded to the victim by law. This section

- 1 does not grant the victim party status or create any cause of
- 2 action for compensation or damages against the Commonwealth or
- 3 any political subdivision, nor any officer, employee or agent of
- 4 the Commonwealth or any political subdivision, or any officer or
- 5 employee of the court.
- 6 (c) As used in this section and as further defined by the
- 7 General Assembly, the term "victim" includes any person against
- 8 whom the criminal offense or delinquent act is committed or who
- 9 <u>is directly harmed by the commission of the offense or act. The</u>
- 10 term "victim" does not include the accused or a person whom the
- 11 court finds would not act in the best interests of a deceased,
- 12 <u>incompetent</u>, <u>minor or incapacitated victim</u>.
- 13 Section 2. (a) Upon the first passage by the General
- 14 Assembly of this proposed constitutional amendment, the
- 15 Secretary of the Commonwealth shall proceed immediately to
- 16 comply with the advertising requirements of section 1 of Article
- 17 XI of the Constitution of Pennsylvania and shall transmit the
- 18 required advertisements to two newspapers in every county in
- 19 which such newspapers are published in sufficient time after
- 20 passage of this proposed constitutional amendment.
- 21 (b) Upon the second passage by the General Assembly of this
- 22 proposed constitutional amendment, the Secretary of the
- 23 Commonwealth shall proceed immediately to comply with the
- 24 advertising requirements of section 1 of Article XI of the
- 25 Constitution of Pennsylvania and shall transmit the required
- 26 advertisements to two newspapers in every county in which such
- 27 newspapers are published in sufficient time after passage of
- 28 this proposed constitutional amendment. The Secretary of the
- 29 Commonwealth shall submit this proposed constitutional amendment
- 30 to the qualified electors of this Commonwealth at the first

- 1 primary, general or municipal election which meets the
- 2 requirements of and is in conformance with section 1 of Article
- 3 XI of the Constitution of Pennsylvania and which occurs at least
- 4 three months after the proposed constitutional amendment is
- 5 passed by the General Assembly.

EXHIBIT C

THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY OF PENNSYLVANIA

SENATE BILL

No. 149

Session of 2019

INTRODUCED BY SABATINA, GORDNER, REGAN, FONTANA, SCHWANK, BLAKE, PHILLIPS-HILL, HUGHES, FOLMER, MARTIN, K. WARD, STEFANO, DISANTO, DINNIMAN, BAKER, COSTA, BARTOLOTTA, KILLION, ARGALL, J. WARD, TARTAGLIONE, MUTH, AUMENT, YUDICHAK, BROWNE AND BOSCOLA, FEBRUARY 1, 2019

REFERRED TO JUDICIARY, FEBRUARY 1, 2019

A JOINT RESOLUTION

- Proposing an amendment to the Constitution of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, providing for rights of victims of crime.
- 3 The General Assembly of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania
- 4 hereby resolves as follows:
- 5 Section 1. The following amendment to the Constitution of
- 6 Pennsylvania is proposed in accordance with Article XI:
- 7 That Article I be amended by adding a section to read:
- 8 § 9.1. Rights of victims of crime.
- 9 (a) To secure for victims justice and due process throughout
- 10 the criminal and juvenile justice systems, a victim shall have
- 11 the following rights, as further provided and as defined by the
- 12 General Assembly, which shall be protected in a manner no less
- 13 vigorous than the rights afforded to the accused: to be treated
- 14 with fairness and respect for the victim's safety, dignity and
- 15 privacy; to have the safety of the victim and the victim's
- 16 family considered in fixing the amount of bail and release

- 1 conditions for the accused; to reasonable and timely notice of
- 2 and to be present at all public proceedings involving the
- 3 criminal or delinguent conduct; to be notified of any pretrial
- 4 <u>disposition of the case; with the exception of grand jury</u>
- 5 proceedings, to be heard in any proceeding where a right of the
- 6 <u>victim is implicated, including, but not limited to, release,</u>
- 7 plea, sentencing, disposition, parole and pardon; to be notified
- 8 of all parole procedures, to participate in the parole process,
- 9 to provide information to be considered before the parole of the
- 10 offender, and to be notified of the parole of the offender; to
- 11 reasonable protection from the accused or any person acting on
- 12 behalf of the accused; to reasonable notice of any release or
- 13 <u>escape of the accused; to refuse an interview, deposition or</u>
- 14 other discovery request made by the accused or any person acting
- 15 on behalf of the accused; full and timely restitution from the
- 16 person or entity convicted for the unlawful conduct; full and
- 17 timely restitution as determined by the court in a juvenile
- 18 delinquency proceeding; to the prompt return of property when no
- 19 longer needed as evidence; to proceedings free from unreasonable
- 20 delay and a prompt and final conclusion of the case and any
- 21 related postconviction proceedings; to confer with the attorney
- 22 for the government; and to be informed of all rights enumerated
- 23 in this section.
- 24 (b) The victim or the attorney for the government upon
- 25 request of the victim may assert in any trial or appellate
- 26 court, or before any other authority, with jurisdiction over the
- 27 case, and have enforced, the rights enumerated in this section
- 28 and any other right afforded to the victim by law. This section
- 29 does not grant the victim party status or create any cause of
- 30 action for compensation or damages against the Commonwealth or

- 1 any political subdivision, nor any officer, employee or agent of
- 2 the Commonwealth or any political subdivision, or any officer or
- 3 <u>employee of the court.</u>
- 4 (c) As used in this section and as further defined by the
- 5 General Assembly, the term "victim" includes any person against_
- 6 whom the criminal offense or delinquent act is committed or who
- 7 <u>is directly harmed by the commission of the offense or act. The</u>
- 8 term "victim" does not include the accused or a person whom the
- 9 court finds would not act in the best interests of a deceased,
- 10 incompetent, minor or incapacitated victim.
- 11 Section 2. (a) Upon the first passage by the General
- 12 Assembly of this proposed constitutional amendment, the
- 13 Secretary of the Commonwealth shall proceed immediately to
- 14 comply with the advertising requirements of section 1 of Article
- 15 XI of the Constitution of Pennsylvania and shall transmit the
- 16 required advertisements to two newspapers in every county in
- 17 which such newspapers are published in sufficient time after
- 18 passage of this proposed constitutional amendment.
- 19 (b) Upon the second passage by the General Assembly of this
- 20 proposed constitutional amendment, the Secretary of the
- 21 Commonwealth shall proceed immediately to comply with the
- 22 advertising requirements of section 1 of Article XI of the
- 23 Constitution of Pennsylvania and shall transmit the required
- 24 advertisements to two newspapers in every county in which such
- 25 newspapers are published in sufficient time after passage of
- 26 this proposed constitutional amendment. The Secretary of the
- 27 Commonwealth shall submit this proposed constitutional amendment
- 28 to the qualified electors of this Commonwealth at the first
- 29 primary, general or municipal election which meets the
- 30 requirements of and is in conformance with section 1 of Article

- 1 XI of the Constitution of Pennsylvania and which occurs at least
- 2 three months after the proposed constitutional amendment is
- 3 passed by the General Assembly.

EXHIBIT D

1	IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA						
2	League of Women Voters of : Pennsylvania and Lorraine Haw, : Petitioners :						
3							
4	v. : No. 578 MD 2019 Kathy Boockvar, the Acting : Secretary of the Commonwealth, Respondent :						
5							
6							
7							
8	TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS						
9	Before:	THE HONORABLE ELLEN CEISLER, Judge					
10	Date:	October 23, 2019, 8:54 a.m.					
11	Place:	Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania					
12	Pennsylvania Judicial Center 601 Commonwealth Avenue, Courtroom No. 3001						
13	Harrisburg, Pennsylvania						
14							
15							
16	APPEARANCES:						
17		Steven E. Bizar, Esquire					
18		Tiffany E. Engsell, Esquire Andrew C. Christy, Esquire For - Petitioners					
19		Nicole J. Boland, Esquire					
20		Caleb C. Enerson, Esquire For - Respondent					
21		•					
22	Moore, Martin Vickless, and Kelly Williams Michael E. Gehring, Esquire						
23							
24							
25							

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THE COURT CRIER: All rise. Commonwealth Court is 1 2 now in session. The Honorable Judge Ceisler presiding. 3 THE COURT: Everyone, take a seat. 4 Good morning, everyone. 5 ALL COUNSEL: Good morning, Your Honor. 6 THE COURT: And for those of you who are new to 7 this courtroom, welcome to the Pennsylvania Commonwealth 8 Court. We have a very, very interesting case today, and I'm 9 excited to hear arguments by counsel. 10 But for the record, why doesn't everybody --11 counsel introduce themselves for the record first? 12 MR. BIZAR: Your Honor, Steven Edward Bizar from 13 Dechert LLP on behalf of the petitioners. 14 MS. ENGSELL: Tiffany Engsell from Dechert LLP, 15 also on behalf of the petitioners. 16 MR. CHRISTY: Andrew Christy from the ACLU of 17 Pennsylvania on behalf of the petitioners. 18 MR. GEHRING: Good morning, Your Honor. Michael 19 Gehring on behalf of int- -- of Steve Harvey Law, 20 representing intervenor Ronald Greenblatt. 21 Okay. Counsel for the respondents? THE COURT: 22 MS. BOLAND: Nicole Boland, Your Honor, from the 23 Office of Attorney General, representing the respondent, the 24 Acting Secretary of the Commonwealth. 25 MR. ENERSON: Good morning, Your Honor. Caleb

Enerson from the Pennsylvania Attorney General's Office, also representing the respondent in this matter.

MR. WITHERS: Good morning, Your Honor. May it please the Court, Scot Withers of Lamb McErlane on behalf of the intervenors Shameekah Moore, Martin Vickless, Kirstin June Irwin, and Kelly Williams. Thank you.

THE COURT: All right, folks. For anybody in the -- in the gallery today, I'm just going to ask that if there are -- I mean, this is a very sensitive subject, and there might be some questions asked or -- by me or comments made by some of the counsel. And I think that it is very important to understand that nobody here is trying to offend anybody. We are just in a truth-seeking process and to understand how the law applies to this amendment.

So I would appreciate if there would be no comments or -- or any kind of disruption if you don't like what's being said at any given point. We're just -- really just trying to understand the law and how it applies.

So we are here today because the petitioners in this matter, they filed an application for special relief in the form of a preliminary injunction. Essentially they are trying to prevent the ballot question which was Joint Resolution 2019, also called Marsy's Law or the Victim Rights Amendment, to the Constitution which would add another section, Section 9.1, to the Pennsylvania Constitution.

The petitioners are seeking to have the Secretary and her agents from submitting this ballot question to the voters on the November 2019 -- in the November 2019 election and until the resolution of this case; or, alternatively, to prevent the certification of election results until resolution of the case.

We have several intervenors in this case.

Particularly, Mr. Withers is here for the victims: Moore,

Vickless, Ms. Irwin, and Kelly Williams. We have intervenor

Ronald Greenblatt. And we had an amicus brief filed by

Office of Chief Counsel, Republican Caucus. And I do

appreciate both parties agreeing to these parties intervening

so we don't have to get into that.

Also, prior to this hearing, there was a discussion and it has been determined that there is no issue and the parties agree to stipulate that nobody is challenging the Secretary or the Commonwealth on the procedure by which this ballot question came into being.

It's understood that the General Assembly and the Office of the Attorney General, they all followed the protocols of the Constitution to get this ballot question on to the voting booth. So we're not — you're going to be able to just talk about that in your argument. We're not going to need any witnesses. There's no challenge to the — the costs and the expenditures and other issues that the — that the

General Assembly went through in terms of harms.

You're going to be able to just talk about that in your argument, Ms. Boland.

There's no one challenging the Pennsylvania

Attorneys General -- Pennsylvania Attorney General's Plain

English Statement, so we're not going to need any witnesses on that.

So we're really going to be dealing with the criteria for the preliminary injunction. That's where we need to focus: the six criteria. And we're going to do this. We'll start with allowing argument by petitioners. We'll start with the main petitioner, Mr. Bizar, for — for Ms. Haw.

And you'll also be speaking to a certain extent for the League of Women Voters.

I will possibly interrupt with questions if -- if I see fit. But it's going to be 30 minutes. And I ask the intervenors only to -- you know, if you feel that something that you really needed to be said wasn't said by one of the lead attorneys in this case. You don't have to speak as long as you felt your rights and your issues have been fairly and fully represented. Okay.

So we'll start with Mr. Bizar from -- from -- who's representing Ms. Haw.

MR. BIZAR: Your Honor, yes. Steve Bizar, again,

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    for the record. I'm from Dechert, and I represent both Ms.
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    Haw and the League of Women Voters.
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                          Thirty minutes, right?
              THE COURT:
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              MR. BIZAR: Yeah. I'm going to do my best.
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              THE COURT: Okay.
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              MR. BIZAR: Your Honor, there are four -- really
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    four issues I want to address, if I may. And, of course, if
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    you have questions, I'll answer them as they come up.
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              The first is the laches point. The second is the
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    balance of the hardships or the balance of the harms.
                                                            The
    third is the likelihood of success on the merits, and the
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    fourth is irreparable injury.
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              And at some point during the discussion or argument
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    with respect to the balance of the hardships or balance of
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    the harms, I think that would be appropriate for
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    Mr. Greenblatt to then -- as we discussed prior to the -- to
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    this session, for Mr. Greenblatt to testify. And then I can
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    resume my argument if that's all right with the Court.
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              THE COURT: Counsel for respondents, intervenors,
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    you agree?
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              MS. BOLAND: Your Honor --
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              THE COURT:
                           That's how we were going to proceed
23
    today.
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              MS. BOLAND: Your Honor, that's fine.
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              THE COURT:
                          Okay.
                                  Good.
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MR. BIZAR: So, Your Honor, we don't need to spend time discussing the legal standards. You're well aware of them. We are here for equity. We are seeking equitable relief. And laches is an equitable defense. It's raised by both the respondent and the crime victim intervenors, so I want to address that first.

They have pages of their brief that call our action untimely, belated, a self-created emergency a hundred and thirteen days after the General Assembly voted, other unkind statements. It goes on and on. And, you know, it also filters over into their argument with respect to the balance of the hardships, the balance of the harms. It's the notion that the ship has sailed and too much has been done, it can't be undone.

All of it, Your Honor, is misplaced. I want to be very clear about what the Court has determined, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court, and what the law of this Commonwealth is. There can be no laches; there is no laches defense in matters involving constitutional challenges. That has been the law since Tausig in 1937. It remains the law today.

The Supreme Court said in Tausig: "Because of the intense importance to the people of the Commonwealth of matters affecting the amendment of their fundamental law," speaking of the Constitution, "the doctrine of laches cannot

be invoked to prevent the determination of the propriety of the submission of an amendment."

Sprague versus Casey, which is a case that they both -- both the intervenors and the respondent rely on --

THE COURT: Sprague versus Costa?

MR. BIZAR: Casey.

THE COURT: Casey?

MR. BIZAR: Yeah. The 1988 one. There are many Sprague cases, Your Honor, as you're well aware.

But the 1988 Sprague versus Casey decision goes through the traditional test for laches, finds out that there's no laches on the situation — on the circumstances there. The plaintiffs cite it for the traditional test for laches. But then Sprague versus Casey, the Supreme Court goes on and says there is no laches. "Laches and prejudice can never be permitted to amend the Constitution."

So that is the law. And constitutional rights, the rights that we're here to protect today and we're trying to protect by this action, the rights secured by Article XI, Section 1 of the Constitution, they do not expire. They are evergreen, Your Honor.

And there are many, many ballot challenges that come up at the last minute. And we're very lucky that courts like the Commonwealth Court are able to act very quickly with respect to those challenges.

Even under the traditional standards — and I just want to get this on the record because they attack the ACLU under this laches argument; even under the traditional standards, laches would not work here. The ACLU is not a party in this case. They're not a petitioner. They are counsel for the League of Women Voters and counsel for Ms. Haw, co-counsel with me.

Mr. Christy from the ACLU is sitting at the -- at the table. And by the way, Jamie Mogil from the League of Women Voters is in the -- in the gallery today, Your Honor, as well.

The ACLU opposed this amendment, unquestionably. They opposed it in 2018. They lobbied against it in 2019. They issued white papers. Those are not white papers by Ms. Haw, and they're not white papers by the League of Women Voters. And the fact that the ACLU opposed the amendment doesn't make the amendment any less unconstitutional than —than anyone else opposing the amendment would make it. It is still a challenge that is being mounted today by the League of Women Voters and Ms. Haw.

And they didn't file their action until October.

And the Secretary did not certify the ballot question to the county boards of election -- and you'll see this -- it's said in their new matter, but it's also -- you'll see it in the exhibits that we're going to hand up by agreement later today

in the proceedings. The Secretary did not certify the matter to the county boards of election until September 11th.

The League of Women Voters didn't vote on this action until October 3rd at their board meeting. We filed October 10th. So we filed within a month of the certification of the ballot question and a month before the election. So even under traditional laches standards, there would be no laches here. Laches is not measured in months, in a — in a month or in — in days.

And by the way, the League of Women Voters is a nonprofit with limited resources. Ms. Haw is an individual citizen and elector with limited resources. They are not, you know, active in Harrisburg in the way that the ACLU is active. And they're not active in Harrisburg the way others, the Marsy's Law people, have been active. So there is no laches under the traditional test.

So let me turn to the balance of the hardships,

Your Honor. It's related to their laches argument in the

sense that they're taking -- basically arguing that it's too

late, too much has been done to advertise --

THE COURT: You're essentially getting into some of the preliminary injunction issues --

MR. BIZAR: I am.

THE COURT: -- at the same time. It all -- it all blends.

1 MR. BIZAR: I'm pivoting to the -- one of the --2 one of the elements of the six-part test that is required to 3 meet a preliminary injunction, to obtain a preliminary 4 injunction. We're going to rely on our papers for most of 5 that, but I want to address the three big ones which you, I 6 think quite correctly, identified. 7 Balance of the hardships or balance of the harms. 8 The Secretary -- the respondent's position is it's too late; 9 too much has been done to advertise and distribute the 10 ballots; some absentee ballots have been collected; they're

And we acknowledge that when we filed the petition -- and in our application and our petition, that was part of the relief we sought -- we had a two-part request. One was to enjoin the -- the ballots. The second part, however, is the part that seeks an injunction to enjoin the Secretary from tabulating and certifying the votes. Now --

THE COURT: Is there a difference between tabulating and certifying? Can you tabulate but not certify?

MR. BIZAR: I think -- tabulate I think means counting.

THE COURT: So can you count but not certify?

MR. BIZAR: I think you can.

THE COURT: And --

out; they can't be pulled back.

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MR. BIZAR: But I think the -- the Secretary would

know this better. The point is certification is when they become final.

THE COURT: Do you think that there's any law or anything in the Election Code that would prevent me from offering that remedy if necessary?

MR. BIZAR: From requiring that the --

THE COURT: That they not be certified --

MR. BIZAR: -- the Secretary not --

THE COURT: -- because the Election Code is very clear that -- that actions by the Secretary have to be immediate. And the word shall is in there, that they shall immediately tabulate and shall immediately certify. So do you think that I would be -- if that were a remedy granted, that I -- that it would not be acceptable?

MR. BIZAR: I think, Your Honor, the Constitution overrides that requirement. I think if the question is whether we're preventing irreparable harm to the voters, to the electorate of Pennsylvania, you have the power to order the Secretary collect the votes but not to tabulate and certify them. And I think there's —

THE COURT: And I would suppose that it would be expected that whatever they're certifying was constitutional. So if -- if -- so that question we're deciding at this point.

MR. BIZAR: Yeah. Well, this is a really important question, Your Honor, and a really, I think, critical issue.

We're not talking today about disenfranchising anybody. We're trying to prevent disenfranchisement.

If the Secretary were to collect the votes but not tabulate and certify them and we go on with this challenge and we lose, nobody would be disenfranchised because the votes would be counted and — and the certification would happen after we lose. And this case, as you know, is going to move very quickly.

If we win and this Court and the Supreme Court ultimately hold that the process that we're challenging through this action, that the — the ballot question and the amendment are unconstitutional, there was no vote that should have been counted. So those votes are not being disenfranchised by not being counted after the fact.

The only parties or citizens that are being disenfranchised potentially here, Your Honor, are the electors of Pennsylvania who don't get to vote on the components of Marsy's Law, the components of the Crime Victims Amendment that they are for and vote against the components that they are against separately as the Constitution requires.

So the risk is if there's an injunction entered and -- if the injunction is denied, rather, and the -- and the vote goes forward and then the law is later -- the amendment is later found to be unconstitutional, they are being

deprived of their constitutional rights. And so Your Honor has the power to freeze the status quo, not disenfranchise anybody. And that's what we're really trying to accomplish here through this action.

But the -- I want to come back to what we're seeking. So the -- the original request to not -- to enjoin the ballot was a mandatory injunction. We're not seeking that now. We --

THE COURT: You're not seeking that?

MR. BIZAR: No, we're not seeking that now. We -we heard loud and clear what the Secretary was saying about
that. We recognize that it's very difficult to obtain a
mandatory injunction in Pennsylvania. We -- we understand
the law.

We're seeking a prohibitory injunction. We are simply seeking that the Secretary collect the votes from the county boards of election, which it's obligated to do, but not tabulate and certify those — those votes until this action has proceeded and the constitutional challenge has been decided.

And we had filed yesterday evening an application for leave to file a reply brief that addresses this, and we've also included a second proposed order on that score which we had omitted from our initial application and petition by -- by oversight. So that's all before the Court.

THE COURT: I didn't have a chance to read that.

MR. BIZAR: Of course. I understand. But -- we're asking a lot. The Court is doing a lot of work, and we really appreciate it.

The point is that the Secretary, if the prohibitory injunction is permitted, need not recall anything. It need not direct the county of election — boards of election to do anything. It can collect the votes. It just doesn't tabulate and certify the votes. If we win, the votes will not count. If we lose, they'll be available to be counted. This is something that is well within the Secretary's capacity, ability.

THE COURT: Has that ever happened before in Pennsylvania?

MR. BIZAR: I think -- I don't know if there's a case that directly addresses this particular issue. I think Costa versus Cortes might be close, but I -- I don't think this particular issue has happened. Let me look at that at the -- at the break when Mr. Greenblatt is testifying.

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. BIZAR: And I'll come back to you on that, Your Honor.

But the point is the Secretary would be out some money. There's no question taxpayer dollars were spent, you know, to advertise and to do the things that the Secretary is

1	required to do under the Election Code. But constitutional
2	rights are paramount. And if those rights are sacrificed, we
3	we submit, Your Honor, that the consequences are much more
4	substantial. We can all be for victims' rights, Your Honor.
5	But if we sacrifice constitutional requirements, every voter,
6	every citizen, every elector suffers.
7	Now I'd like to give an opportunity for
8	Mr. Greenblatt to testify about some of the other hardships
9	that would occur, Your Honor, if because we're talking
10	about the balance of the hardships right now. And then I'll
11	come back and pick up my argument if that's all right with
12	you.
13	THE COURT: It sounds like good timing. Thank you.
14	MR. BIZAR: Thank you.
15	MR. GEHRING: Your Honor, would you prefer I
16	question question Mr. Greenblatt from counsel table or
17	from the lectern?
18	THE COURT: From there, if you don't mind.
19	(Indicating.) It's easier for me to hear.
20	MR. GEHRING: Not at all, Your Honor.
21	THE COURT: You'll you can sit at the witness
22	stand.
23	(Whereupon, Ronald Greenblatt, Esquire, was sworn.)
24	DIRECT EXAMINATION
25	BY MR. GEHRING:

1 Good morning, Mr. Greenblatt. Could you state your Q 2 full name please? 3 Yes. Ronald Greenblatt. 4 THE COURT: And if you could keep your voice close 5 to the microphone. MR. GEHRING: Yes, Your Honor. 6 7 THE COURT: That sounds good. Thank you. 8 BY MR. GEHRING: What do you do for a living? 9 10 I'm an attorney here in the Commonwealth of Α 11 Pennsylvania. Do you specialize in any particular area? 12 13 Yes; criminal law. 14 And what side are you on, defense side or 15 prosecution side? I'm -- I'm a criminal lawyer. I represent 16 17 individuals. 18 Thank you. And how long have you been doing this? 0 19 Α Thirty-two years. 20 When -- where did you go to law school? Q 21 I went to Rutgers Law School in Camden. Α 22 And when did you graduate? Q 23 1987. Α 24 What did you do after law school? Q 25 I was hired as an assistant defender at the Α

Defender Association of Philadelphia in 1987. I worked there till the end of 1996.

Q Could you just briefly describe your responsibilities while you were with the Defender Association?

A Yes. I was a trial attorney. I did -- I had some supervisory roles when I was there, on a three-month rotating basis. So the job -- the way the Defender Association of Philadelphia works is they work what's called a horizontal system of representation. In other words, a vertical system would be when you get the case from the beginning and you work it through to the end. The end could be the trial. The end could be the appellate process. That's not the way the Defender Association works because of the high volume of cases.

So the way that it would work is after you pass the bar and you're allowed to go to court, you do what are called preliminary hearings. And the way that that works is you're assigned approximately 30 cases a day, three days a week.

On the off days, you do prison interviewing or office interviewing where you interview another ten people. So your job is to, we call it, advance the file: write it up as best you can, do the best job you could, and then write a memo about what to do on the case.

After a certain period of time, usually three or

four months, you're moved into what's called the municipal court rotation. Municipal court is exclusive to Philadelphia, and it handles misdemeanor crimes, crimes with a maximum sentence of five years or less. Again, you rotate then: three days in court one week, two days the next; handling anywhere from 25 to 50 cases a day when you're in court. Not all of them go to trial, but you have 25 to 50. And you stay in that rotation for approximately three to six months.

Then when I did it -- it's different now -- you went over to what's called the juvenile court, handling delinquency matters. When you're handling delinquency matters there, you're given everything -- and this is even as a young attorney a year and a half in -- from arson cases, rape cases, every kind of case. And you try those for about six months.

After that, you rotate through to what we call the felony waiver program which is nonmajor felonies. And for — then literally you were given eight felony cases a day, five days a week. Again, not all of them go to trial, but you're expected to prepare all those cases. You're given a one week prep time. So you do that for a couple of years.

And I think for me around the beginning of 1990 is when I first went into the major trial rotation. And then you're given major jury trials to try. Everything except for

murder is called a major jury trial in -- in Philadelphia.

So, you know, I did that. And you rotate back sometime. I had some supervisory responsibilities, being --

THE COURT: I think you're not in the --

THE WITNESS: (Adjusting microphone.)

THE COURT: There you go. You just went --

THE WITNESS: -- being -- you know, whether it was supervising people at the prison, supervising people in the office, being a supervisor in court as new attorneys came up.

And then I think it was in 1993 I went into what's called their special defense unit. Special defense unit picks two lawyers and were given specialized forensic training, media training on how to handle some of the most complex cases in the office.

THE COURT: Do you think the office is still run pretty similar at this --

THE WITNESS: Oh, I know -- Judge, I know it is. I mean, I'm in contact with the Defender Association daily.

THE COURT: Okay.

THE WITNESS: So it's still run -- there might be differences because they did what's called zoning the court system about five or six years ago. But other than that, the training is the same; some of the -- a lot of the same people are there. So it's still run the same way.

THE COURT: Okay.

THE WITNESS: And I'm also familiar with the investigative process that they use at the public defender's office.

So when I was in special defense, one of the things you do is we are assigned — the two attorneys that do SDU are in charge of all what are called the rape prelim—— or sexual assault preliminary hearings. So any adult that's charged with that kind of crime, two of us are given — are given the assignments. And we are — make sure that either we do the preliminary hearings or we have to get someone to cover them if we're on trial. So we're literally looking at, you know, hundreds of cases through the year on those.

THE COURT: And this is all going to lead to how this will be impacted by the Victim Rights Amendment?

THE WITNESS: Yes, Your Honor, because what I think is important to know is that I then went into private practice in -- in 1996 where I did a lot of court-appointed work for a lot of years -- I still do some pro bono work; I don't do court-appointed work anymore -- along with handling it from the private.

And I also handle cases throughout southeastern

Pennsylvania, the surrounding — surrounding counties. I've

done cases in Indiana County too. I've done cases here in

Dauphin County. But most of my work is in southeastern

Pennsylvania.

1 And over that period of time, I understand the 2 investigative process from both the court-appointed level, 3 whether it's a public defender or someone who's 4 court-appointed, or from the private. And that's what I 5 think that this law impacts; how you do the investigation, 6 your pretrial rights. There's some other rights we can talk 7 about later. But that's when I -- when I read the law and 8 saw --9 THE COURT: Can you be specific then? 10 THE WITNESS: Yes, Your Honor. 11 THE COURT: How the -- how these new rights for 12 victims would cause irreparable harm to the work that you do 13 and the rights of the accused --14 THE WITNESS: Yes. Specifically, Your Honor, if I 15 could turn to the comments and the law so I can have that in 16 front of me. 17 Judge, first I'd like to --

THE COURT: Immediate and irreparable harm.

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THE WITNESS: Immediate and irreparable harm. Yes, Your Honor.

MR. WITHERS: Your Honor, may I request that we be directed to the document that the witness is reviewing on the stand?

THE COURT: Yes. I don't think I have it either.

THE WITNESS: Yes. Judge, I'm reading the Plain

1 English Statement of the Office of the Attorney General --2 Okay. THE COURT: Thank you. 3 THE WITNESS: -- along with Section 9.1, the rights 4 of victims of crime. 5 MR. WITHERS: Thank you. 6 THE WITNESS: Judge, I'd like to first talk about 7 the one comment dealing -- which I think deals with pretrial 8 rights. 9 THE COURT: This is the pretrial -- this is the 10 Plain English Statement? 11 THE WITNESS: The Plain English Statement, which is 12 -- which is also in the law, where it says -- and I'm on page 13 2 of --14 THE COURT: The Plain English Statement, though, is 15 not the amendment. I found some big differences between the 16 Plain English Statement as opposed to the amendment. 17 THE WITNESS: Well, I'll look at the amendment 18 then, Judge, because what I'm talking about is the same. 19 There might be differences. I was just looking at what I 20 thought, you know, had a practical effect. 21 To refuse an interview, deposition, or other 22 discovery request made by the accused or any person acting on 23 behalf of the accused.

person acting on behalf of the accused is the lawyer. And

Judge, when I read that statement, to me, any

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that's the -- the prism that I look at this for.

Well, the first parts, to refuse an interview, well, that exists now. I mean, I can go out and talk to a witness, and they don't have to talk to me as long as -- I have to identify who I am. They don't want to talk to me, they don't want to talk to me.

Depositions. There's no depositions in criminal court in the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania. There can be concurrent civil suits filed, and I've seen that done by —you know, by someone — the alleged victim, file it at the same time for that.

But more what I want to talk about is the third part, the discovery requests made by the accused. And I think it's important to talk about that in terms of the investigation that is done immediately and as affects pretrial motions in cases.

I'd like to start, Judge, with text messages, okay, and our ability to get text messages. What we do ordinarily is, because if the police don't take the cell phone into custody, which in Philadelphia and some of the surrounding counties, they just don't do, when there's an allegation of assault that might lead to -- or some kind of fraud that might lead to the necessity of what was going on, in this day and age, everybody -- not everybody, but most people are texting everything in real time as it has -- so it has vital,

valuable evidence in there.

What we do is we then go to court and we ask for the cell phone to be taken into custody and the cell phone to be mirrored, that is, imaged, so we can get the rights to do it. Well, I've had the DAs fight me on that now, but it's been ruled that we -- we're entitled to it.

If you read this law, they can refuse a discovery request. In other words, they're trying to say — I read this law as saying they can say, No, look, I'm a crime victim; I'm not giving you my cell phone. Right. The damage that that causes is irreparable. Let me explain. There's —

THE COURT: I don't know if you even have to limit it to text. I mean, social media, any -- anything --

THE WITNESS: I was going to get to all of them.

THE COURT: So they wouldn't be able to use it in the trial, though, the prosecution, if they won't give to you. They have to turn everything over. But I guess it's preventing your investigation. Is that what you're trying to say?

THE WITNESS: Yes. That's what I'm saying; my investigation, Judge. And — and that's when I talked about investigatory technique. One of the things we're taught from the first day I was a public defender, first week when you go through the training is the importance of doing investigation immediately and preserving evidence immediately.

Under this, you can't do it. And I can tell you, Judge, that when it comes to e-mails, text messages, and social media, they can be immediately deleted. Even if they're not deleted -- that's spoliation, but how do you prove it? You can't prove it on things like text messages.

I can tell you I've just worked on a case where Apple makes their encryption program so that you can't tell what was deleted. So you have to get and take immediately or valuable, vital evidence is lost. That goes for social media, text messages, e-mails.

So if you don't do it right away, it is gone. And it is not retrievable later on. It is gone permanently. So that, to me, is irreparable harm. And it can't be cured because the Commonwealth, they can — you know, even — assuming the Commonwealth acts in good faith and sometime later on they say, You know what, we should get the text messages to be fair, well, they don't have a duty to get them right away. They don't have to do it. That is the criminal defense attorney's role to do that investigation immediately, not down the road, to gather whatever evidence they can.

The police have the right and the DA or the Attorney General has the right — if someone walks into a police station and says, Ron Greenblatt robbed me, they have probable cause, and I can be arrested. And in Philadelphia, that goes on all the time, and it does in the surrounding

counties. There doesn't have to be any investigation similar to what people think. And a lot of times there isn't because of the volume and they just want to make an arrest.

Well, then the criminal defense attorney has to go and meet with the client and say, Look, what evidence do you have? What can we do? And -- and -- and using your own experience and what your client tells you, what investigation can be done.

There might be security camera footage. Right. Suppose it's a bar. And the bar owner or the person who owns the grocery store, they're certainly a victim of crime if somebody robbed them. Right. And someone might be accused of that crime, or someone is in the situation that I'm talking about --

THE COURT: So what I'm hearing you say then is that if this ballot question and the amendment was enacted — and it would be enacted immediately upon the vote of the electorate if they went for it — that all of accused rights as it relates to investigations would be immediately hindered.

THE WITNESS: Yes. And that also goes to pretrial motions.

THE COURT: Okay.

THE WITNESS: Okay. Let me explain, Your Honor.

A lot of times with text messages -- and -- and I'm

not talking hypothetically, Judge. I was supposed to be on trial this week with a case, this week, October 21st, with a very serious rape case where if I didn't get the text messages, the case might have gone to trial. But because we got the text messages and we were able to show many inconsistencies in the trial, pretrial motions were granted and the Commonwealth withdrew the charges. So this isn't some hypothetical I'm talking about. This is an actual case.

So you get those --

THE COURT: Are you talking about suppression and in limine motions and that sort of thing?

THE WITNESS: Exactly, Your Honor. So -- so if you get those -- in this case, we got the text messages. There were severe inconsistencies on what was claimed versus what was actually in the text messages. The Commonwealth made decisions based on that not to call people.

If this -- this law is enacted, we can't do that. We wouldn't have that evidence. And that's irreparable when it comes to in limine motions, when it comes to motions to suppress.

I've talked about e-mails and social media, but there's also documents; bank statements even. You know, I could see an instance in white collar cases where, you know, a business claims an employee stole from them and there's some kind of fraud. You need those bank statements. And you

can't get them till when. You want to do your investigation immediately. People could be held in jail. They have their liberty deprived in so many different ways. And you're -- you're told you can't do investigation in the case, because that's the way that I read that.

That's the irreparable harm that I see to -- to my profession, to us trying to free people who are accused who are innocent of crimes. And -- and I think that that harm is irreparable because that's what's going to happen under that provision.

There's -- there's probably other ways. Let me talk about a case, an assault case where the -- the -- the alleged victim is a police officer. We have the right to go into -- we being the defense has the right -- and I think the lead case is Mejia-Arias, Your Honor, on that -- to go into the files and see if there's been any similar complaints against police officers. Have there been internal affairs, other complaints that we can go into?

THE COURT: You mean the vic- -- the police officer is assaulted by a citizen?

THE WITNESS: Exactly. And -- and -- and I can see the police coming in and saying, Look, we're crime victims here. You know, this is harassing; we don't want him looking into -- him being myself, the attorney, looking into prior instances of bad conduct.

Under this, they have the right to refuse that discovery request, a constitutional right to refuse a discovery request. That harm is irreparable. You can't cure that down the road because it doesn't say at trial it has to be turned over. They have the right to refuse it at any time.

Going back to the cell phone, they have the right to refuse it at any time to turn that over.

I -- I can't think of all of it. You know, and there are some other harms that I see down the road that are not curable harms. You know, this cannot stand in a society that values the presumption of innocence because what you're going to end up with is innocent people being convicted. There is no doubt.

You know, I have handled and been involved in well over 10,000 cases. That's why I was giving the number, that when I was a young public defender and a public defender of -- of what I did. So when you do that and you talk about the volume of cases and you're talking about how you don't have the right to present a defense because --

THE COURT: Counsel, I -- I read this amendment when they also define victim, they also define victim as anyone who is directly harmed by the commission. So would that prevent you then from going to eyewitnesses and getting -- well, people who are directly harmed can -- can be more

than just the victim itself.

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THE WITNESS: It could be their family. It could be --

THE COURT: It could be communities --

THE WITNESS: It could be communities. I mean, how far do you want to take this? I imagine the --

THE COURT: So does this amendment prevent you from doing investigations with those who are directly impacted by the crime also?

THE WITNESS: Yes. Under this, even if I say, well, look -- say -- let's take a white collar case. And I think that someone is protecting someone else, and I want to go get their bank records. Whoa. Whoa. Whoa. You know, that's my friend. I'm harmed by this too. I'm refusing to give you bank records. I'm refusing to give you video surveillance footage. I'm refusing to turn over cell phones. I'm refusing to give you social media. So all of that under this is done, and it's irreparable.

BY MR. GEHRING:

Mr. Greenblatt, in -- could you estimate in what Q percentage of cases do you seek and obtain discovery?

Well, every single case that I've ever handled has discovery in it. A lot of it is mandatory under the -- well, it's all mandatory there. But that's what I get from the Commonwealth. Okay. But I'm talking about the investigation and the discovery that we want to do that needs to be done immediately. And this is all under the rubric of discovery. And that's the way that the trial court judge looks at it. You know, is it discoverable? Maybe is it Brady? What kind of information is it that you get? So in every case there's discovery.

Q Do you get --

THE COURT: So you suggest that this will happen to defense attorneys representing the accused throughout the Commonwealth.

THE WITNESS: Absolutely, Judge. As I said, while I started as a Philadelphia public defender, I've done cases mostly in southeastern Pennsylvania. But I've done cases here in Dauphin County. I've done a case in Indiana County.

And also, Judge, my background is that I'm a member of the Pennsylvania Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers. I'm the former vice president of the eastern region. I've served on several committees there. I actually was the chairperson of the Philadelphia chapter of the Pennsylvania Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers.

And I was — until last year, I spent nine years on the board of trustees for the Pennsylvania Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers. So we discuss statewide issues all the time. And the rules are the same no matter what county you're in. So I can't think of a county that this wouldn't

apply to.

BY MR. GEHRING:

Q Mr. Greenblatt, does -- does -- does getting discovery from -- from the victims and the -- the accusers in cases -- is that done in any particular type of case or -- or what's the range of cases in which you seek that type of discovery?

A Well, any case where I think it could be relevant, anything from assault cases to theft cases. You know, I can't think of the case -- you know, it could be -- you know, arson cases, we've done it. You know, I can't think of the case that it wouldn't happen. Obviously homicide cases.

So -- so it's in every case. If you're -- if you're practicing your profession the right way, on day one, your first -- when you do your initial meeting with your client, you're formulating your investigative plan. And especially today as opposed to 32 years ago when there weren't cell phones, there weren't text messages, there weren't e-mails that you could so easily get, you know, you have to be at the top of your game --

THE COURT: I've seen cases won or lost on Facebook.

THE WITNESS: I have had several cases won or lost on Facebook, Judge. I've had several cases -- I've had a case on Instagram turn. But I've had -- and I can speak for

my firm. We've had a lot of cases turn on text messages because people nowadays, a lot -- especially younger people, they don't pick up the phone and call; everything is by text.

Even the most incriminating statements are on texts. And you get them. And sometimes you can go to the prosecutor and the case ends there. Or sometimes you can get them and you might come up with a, you know, look, this isn't the whole thing that happened; can we negotiate on this case to resolve it? But you get to the truth.

And that's what I'm talking about, getting to the truth. And I see the irreparable harm that this causes as people not wanting to get to the truth. As ever — as ever unpleasant that might be for one side or another, you have to fairly investigate these cases. And this irreparably harms the right to investigate cases.

BY MR. GEHRING:

Q Mr. Greenblatt, how often does obtaining discovery from crime victims lead to evidence that is significant to the defense of your clients?

A Very often. As I said, I'm supposed to be on trial on a case right now where that made the biggest difference. But getting evidence in the case — it doesn't occur in every case. I mean, a lot of cases are narcotics cases or things like that. It doesn't — you know, doesn't affect it as much. But — but when you're talking about that kind of

evidence, we try and get it every time we can.

In fact, Judge, last year, because the technology is changing so much, we actually gave a seminar from the Philadelphia chapter where I spoke on the importance of getting cell phone evidence, because in some jurisdictions — I know in England, it's mandatory that the cell phone be — cell phones be turned over. That's a mandatory part of what an investigation is. That's not that way in the United States right now.

But certainly the way it's going, you could easily see the -- the -- that trend going. And maybe at some point the prosecution will gather that right away. But they don't now. And -- they just don't do it. And it really is for the practitioner to make sure that they go out -- the defense practitioner to go make sure that they get the information and the investigation.

Q Mr. Greenblatt, is -- is there any other aspect of Marsy's Law that will negatively impact your ability to defend your clients?

A Yes.

THE COURT: That would cause immediate and irreparable harm.

MR. GEHRING: That would cause immediate and irreparable harm.

THE WITNESS: Yes.

MR. GEHRING: Thank you, Your Honor.

THE WITNESS: Judge, again, I'm looking at 9.1, rights of victims in crimes; not the comments.

Right at -- right up at the top when it talks about the rights of victims -- and -- and I say, Judge, that these are allegations at this time because nobody has been convicted of anything -- to be treated with fairness and respect for the victim's safety, dignity, and privacy.

I could easily see a prosecutor or -- and some judges, not all judges, limiting the right to cross-examination on that. You know, part of being -- and the fundamental right that the accused has is the --

MR. WITHERS: Your Honor, I have to object to this line of testimony. He's speculating as to what might happen in a future case. This is --

THE COURT: Counsel --

MR. WITHERS: -- pure speculation --

THE COURT: -- there's an absolute right to cross-examine. It's part of our fundamental adversarial system. He's talking about a cons- -- a fundamental constitutional right, so I think it's absolutely relevant.

THE WITNESS: So I could easily see a prosecutor saying, you know, Look, the defense attorney is questioning too harshly. I mean, we hear that all the time, that the defense attorney questioned too harshly, the defense attorney

1 is being too aggressive in his or her questions. The --2 The defense attorney delving into THE COURT: 3 private matters if it relates to domestic violence --4 THE WITNESS: Right. 5 THE COURT: -- or child abuse or rape or any kind 6 of --7 THE WITNESS: Right. THE COURT: -- sensitive crimes. 8 9 THE WITNESS: Yes. I mean --10 THE COURT: You hear a lot that victims feel 11 victimized by the system. THE WITNESS: And -- and, Judge, I am not here to 12 13 say that -- as someone who's practiced criminal law for 32 14 years, that victims don't need to be respected, don't need to 15 be heard, don't need to come into court and state their 16 opinion on a sentence or -- or -- or be informed of what's 17 going on in the case, in the case. I agree with all that. 18 I've seen it thousands of times. 19 20 21 scenarios in -- where there's children witnesses.

But I'm talking about at a trial what could be used to limit cross-examination. I mean, I can imagine easily scenarios in -- where there's children witnesses. Judge, it's a child witness. They're a victim of crime; you know, really, Judge? And -- I mean, I can see a prosecutor saying any questioning, any questioning gets into their right to privacy and -- and insults their dignity as -- as a child;

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Judge, you can't allow cross-examination in this case.

And I'm not saying every judge would accept that, but there will be judges that will accept that argument.

There is no doubt in my mind.

THE COURT: Well, if this was a -- a constitutional amendment, they'd have no choice, the judges.

THE WITNESS: Right. So now you have cross-examination extremely limited or eliminated. Right. No due process. Eliminated. The person gets on the stand. What they said has to be taken. Has to be taken. There's no right to cross-examination. You've got competing rights. There's a crime victim bill.

So I could see that argument being made. And even if it's not accepted, at the appellate level. In other words, a judge makes a ruling. You go through the -- the farce of a trial that that would be, and the person is then convicted. And it later reversed, because that's what we're talking about, the immediacy. Well, now it takes years, because I can imagine -- I'll leave it to the -- Your Honor and the lawyers to argue this, but going through the federal courts, this kind of test. How long is that going to take?

THE COURT: These -- these cases won't go federal -- through federal courts. This is Pennsylvania.

THE WITNESS: Well, if it's a right to -- well,

I'll leave that to the lawyer -- you, the lawyers to decide.

1 But -- but -- but I see it abridging rights to 2 cross-examination. And -- and obviously that's irreparable 3 harm. 4 BY MR. GEHRING: 5 Mr. Greenblatt, do you see any problem with speedy 6 trial rights of criminal defendants? 7 Yes. Your Honor, as you are well aware, 8 Pennsylvania has speedy trial rules that some jurisdictions 9 don't have. 10 THE COURT: Is that 600, Rule 600? 11 THE WITNESS: Yes, Your Honor. 12 Because of the notification rules, I can see that 13 there would be times that this would bump up against speedy 14 trial rules. It could cause delays in cases. That would be 15 unfortunate. That would be unfortunate. 16 It -- you can almost see it being a reverse effect 17 for the crime victims because of the delay in cases. A case 18 gets thrown out, and there's not even a chance for fairness 19 because of the delays caused by having to have -- notify 20 people. The Commonwealth says, I can't notify the witness, 21 so we need a continuance, Judge. 22 THE COURT: So did I -- so you believe victim --23 victims could be hurt by this?

24 THE WITNESS: I think so.

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THE COURT: If the case is thrown out.

THE WITNESS: Sure.

THE COURT: If the victim and/or anyone directly impacted by the crime isn't notified.

THE WITNESS: Right. And who's directly -- who's directly impacted? I mean, I would say if my child was robbed, I'm directly impacted by it. I don't care how old they are. Somebody does it; I'm directly impacted by it. Am I -- you know, I should be notified. Or I'd want to be -- that's for sure -- if something like that happened.

So -- and, you know, I've been with family -- I have family members that have been crime victims. And, you know, I want to be there for them, especially because of what I do. So -- so I can see -- I can see that happening.

BY MR. GEHRING:

Q Mr. Greenblatt, do you see any immediate and irreparable harm flowing from enactment of -- of this amendment with regard to plea negotiations?

A Well, yes. I mean, Judge, as we talked about the pretrial investigation that can't be done, now you're in the situation where you --

THE COURT: Where -- where is there something about plea negotiations in this amendment?

THE WITNESS: It's not directly in the amendment, but we're talking about harm that could be caused to the practitioner or to the judicial system, to the criminal

justice system by this, because, Judge, what I think is that -- is if you don't have the right to do investigation in the cases and you don't really know your case, you're really hamstrung in negotiating with the Commonwealth because you can't say what the text messages say, what e-mail says, what the social media, what the bank records, what the internal e-mails of a company -- we don't know any of that.

THE COURT: Medical records.

THE WITNESS: Medical records. Right. I don't know any of those because, right, the -- the -- the victim can say, Look, you can't look at my medical records. And I don't know if they were drunk, they were high, anything about that. If the injuries that they claim are inconsistent with what we have, I have no way of knowing that. So now I have to negotiate in that case.

You know, in a practical effect, there's going to be people sitting in jail who are innocent, who are going to take pleas to get out of jail without having the right to have their case fairly investigated in a way or be properly represented.

And that's irreparable, because as you can imagine, what are you supposed to say when -- say the law gets overturned later on, right, and the person has already pled guilty. They've already served their sentence. They've lost jobs. The economic -- the economic opportunities a person

loses because of a criminal conviction are very significant.

And you can't make up for that. So -- so you can't change that. You can't put that back in the box.

BY MR. GEHRING:

Mr. Greenblatt, you had mentioned -- you just mentioned a moment ago about the possibility of the law being enacted and then being overturned. Is -- will the uncertainty in the status of this law cause problems in and of itself?

A Yes. Judge, I don't think -- while I've spent my life as a criminal defense attorney, obviously I've worked with hundreds if not over a thousand prosecutors in my career, and I've appeared in front of several hundred judges in criminal court. Whenever there's uncertainty, it makes things difficult.

What are you going to have to worry about down the road, that is, the practitioner? What rights are you going to do? What motions are you going to have to litigate that really wouldn't be necessary to litigate if you had a full chance to investigate or you knew the law was the law?

Like, at some point if -- if this passes and it goes through -- through the courts, the courts will say yea or nay to different provisions. I don't know, something like that. And then you know. Then you have certainty, and you can work under that certainty because the law is certain.

You have something like this and you enact this and say, Go forth and we'll figure it out later, which is basically what would happen if this was enacted, everybody is in a state of flux; and I think for years. But — and when you talk about years, how many tens of thousands of cases are you talking about that could easily come back and have to be relitigated, pleas undone, trials redone until we get the certainty that the law is?

And I can see that affecting defendants. And I can see that affecting victims because if a victim has to go through a trial and the person accused is then convicted and then a new trial is granted and they have to go through that trial all over again, I mean, that, to me, is a harm to be —to be considered.

And it's irreparable when these things happen.

Irreparable harm is not just -- is -- is several things.

Right. It's an innocent person being convicted or it's somebody who's a victim of crime having to go through it twice. And I can -- I can't envision where that would not happen. I just can't under this.

- Q Mr. Greenblatt, do you believe that enactment of this law will lead to more motion practice for your clients?
 - A Oh, absolutely --

THE COURT: More what?

MR. GEHRING: Motion practice. And I'll let

Mr. Greenblatt explain.

THE WITNESS: Yeah, Judge. There's -- there's -- because -- if this law is enacted before it goes through and passes constitutional muster, I can imagine myself, I would be in front of -- in every case that I had that I thought was going to trial, that again I'd put provisions on any plea I did because what if it comes back to reopen it.

But I would do motions. Judge, in this case, I wasn't able to get the cell phone records because the -- the victim refused. I wasn't able to get the medical records because the victim refused. I wasn't able to get the e-mails that I sought.

And I would advise any attorney that I was training on this issue and anyone in my office: You've got to lay that all out on the record in every single case, what you couldn't get because of this law so that it would be clear down the road to a court looking when you sought to get a new trial. So you have to do that in all your cases. And not to do it, to me, would be malpractice.

BY MR. GEHRING:

- Q Mr. Greenblatt, do you believe that what you were talking about will lead to more interlocutory appeals as well?
- A Oh, definitely. You know, I could see provisions where a judge said -- I went for the cell phone and the judge

said, Yeah, you know, we're giving the defense the cell phone; interlocutory appeal by the Commonwealth.

Or I could see the judge not giving the defense the cell phone and the judge — and saying to a judge: Judge, Look, this is a new law that you're not giving me the cell phone, that you're not giving the defense access to the cell phone; I'd like to take an interlocutory. You know, we don't have it as of right from the defense, but a judge could certainly grant an interlocutory appeal.

And I could see a lot of the judges who I practice in front of seeing a new law and seeing the importance of this saying, Yes, Defense, I'm going to grant your right to interlocutory appeal on these issues. And then the issues go up to the Superior Court, maybe then to the Supreme Court.

THE COURT: And the victims aren't getting resolution and neither are the accused --

THE WITNESS: Absolutely.

THE COURT: -- while this is all happening.

THE WITNESS: Right. And -- and I -- I can clearly see that happening with -- the majority of judges that I practice in front of would understand the importance of this issue. And I believe many if not most would grant the interlocutory appeal. The Commonwealth has it as of right. The defense has it -- has the ability to ask for it. But I -- I can see it on these cases on the issues that we're

talking about.

BY MR. GEHRING:

Q Mr. Greenblatt, do you believe that passage of this law will create confusion and problems for persons other than criminal defense attorneys and -- and -- and their clients?

A Well, I think when I talked about judges and -- and prosecutors because of the uncertainty, but I also think in the public, Your Honor, you know, when there's uncertainty about what the police officers -- you know, what they have the right to get.

I mean, some police jurisdictions that I've dealt with do go to seize cell phones right away. It's not in Philadelphia, but -- but some do. And the person that -- that's the victim or the alleged victim in the case says, You can't have my cell phone. And they have the right to refuse under this. So what do the police do with their investigation? I don't want to speak for the police completely, but I can see that coming up and being an issue.

Q Do you foresee any problems that could be caused if the law is enacted and then later found unconstitutional?

A Yes, Judge. If I wasn't clear from -- from what I had said earlier --

THE COURT: I thought you were clear.

THE WITNESS: Okay.

THE COURT: Unless you have something else you

wanted to add.

THE WITNESS: No. That's the problem with the reversals that can come from that, you know, trying to withdraw guilty pleas; PCRAs; you know, all the way through the process; guilty pleas trying to be withdrawn based on — if the law is overturned; trials, depending on what stage of the appellate process; direct appeals —

THE COURT: So you're saying there's uncertainty to victims as well through all of this.

THE WITNESS: Yes.

BY MR. GEHRING:

Q Mr. Greenblatt, even if a conviction is overturned on appeal because Marsy's Law is found unconstitutional, will that necessarily give them back the rights that they lost?

A No. I mean, people have spent years in -- could have spent years in jail. You can't get that back.

And importantly for when you talk about irreparable harm, Judge, going back to the cell phones, the e-mails, and the social media, you can't get that back again. If you don't get that right away, you've lost it. I've lost it when I've waited too long. Sometimes you only have 30 days to get this material.

So if you get hired in a case down the road, in other words, someone hires you six months later, and you go, Wow, I've got to get the cell phone records. I've got to get

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And you send the subpoena, and it's gone. You waited too late.

I think Comcast is a hundred and eighty days.

the e-mail. I've got to get the social media from the case.

I think Comcast is a hundred and eighty days.

Directly I know because I've -- I've had that. And they just don't have it after that. They just don't have the records that you need.

I could go through others, but -- but same thing; it's lost.

MR. GEHRING: That's all I have, Your Honor.

MR. BIZAR: Your Honor, may I simply ask two questions before cross?

THE COURT: Sure.

MR. BIZAR: Thank you, Your Honor.

And just to assist the Court, I think you asked where plea negotiations come up. 9.1, subsection (a), which is the long list of the additional rights that are afforded to victims, in the middle of that paragraph gives victims the right to be heard in the plea process. And I just wanted to call that to the Court's attention first, you know, for your convenience.

THE COURT: He was more concerned about going into a plea negotiation without enough evidence --

MR. BIZAR: Right. I --

THE COURT: -- or a good investigation, but --

I think that's right. 1 MR. BIZAR: 2 This is the opportunity to be heard for THE COURT: 3 that. 4 Right, for the victim. MR. BIZAR: 5 THE COURT: Yeah. CROSS-EXAMINATION 6 7 BY MR. BIZAR: 8 So, Mr. Greenblatt, I just want to follow up on 9 something that you testified to. If you were to advise a 10 client, criminal defendant, to plead guilty during the 11 pendency of a -- of a suit, of a criminal matter because of 12 the effect the amendment has on the ability of your client to 13 defend himself or herself, what quarantee would your client 14 have to be able to take back that plea if the petitioners 15 were ultimately to prevail absent provisions or some other 16 reservations? 17 There's no quarantee. In fact, if time lapses --18 because PCRA, Post Conviction Relief Act, has certain time 19 restrictions to it; if it's past that time restriction, you 20 know, and then there's newly -- newly acquired evidence, 21 provisions, you know, there's ways around it, that -- that's 22 lost forever. 23 You mentioned using a process, compulsory process

to obtain investigative materials as part of your

investigation process?

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1	A Yes, sir.	
2	Q And does that apply to testimony as well, helpful	
3	testimony other than from the victim?	
4	A Could you clarify that?	
5	Q Third parties, witnesses?	
6	A Sure.	
7	Q What guarantee do you have that courts would extend	
8	trial dates so that you could have the ability to use	
9	compulsory process if this petition is denied?	
10	A None. I mean, that's up to the trial judge,	
11	whether the trial judge determines that the case can be held	
12	in abeyance. There can be an interlocutory appeal. So, I	
13	mean, it's up to the trial judge.	
14	MR. BIZAR: Okay. Thank you very much, Your Honor.	
15	Thank you.	
16	MS. BOLAND: May I cross, Your Honor?	
17	THE COURT: Yes, ma'am.	
18	CROSS-EXAMINATION	
19	BY MS. BOLAND:	
20	Q Good morning, Mr. Greenblatt.	
21	A Good morning.	
22	Q Is it Greenblott or Green Greenblatt?	
23	A $-B-L-A-T-T$; -blatt.	
24	Q -blatt. Okay. So you've been doing this for a	
25	long time?	

- 1 Α Yes. 2 You've been doing this since the 1990s, you said? Q 3 1980s. Α 4 1980s. Okay. I apologize. Q 5 Α No problem. 6 It's been since the 1990s that you've been doing 7 major jury trials. Do I have that right? Well, actually the ones conducting, yeah. My first 8 9 -- the first major jury trial I did -- I did nonjury trials 10 in major cases before 1990, but my first jury trial was 11 nineteen -- January of 1990. 12 Okay. And then as of 1996, you started doing 13 court-appointed work. Is that correct? Did I get your 14 testimony right? 15 No. Α 16 Okay. Q 17 A public defender is a court-appointed lawyer. Α 18 Okay. Q 19 Okay. So we consider ourselves -- there's two Α 20
 - types of court-appointed lawyers. The first would be public defenders. People -- and every county in Pennsylvania has public defenders. The second is court-appointed work that's also the same thing; you're working for people without funds and -- to pay --

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THE COURT: And then if there's conflicts and that

sort of thing.

THE WITNESS: Right. Two or three people get arrested on the case. Suppose the -- the complainant has a prior record that the public defender represented. That case has to be conflicted out.

BY MS. BOLAND:

- Q Okay. So --
- A So I started doing that in 1997.
- Q Okay. So you've been practicing since the '80s. You've been handling jury trials since the early '90s, and you've been handling various court-appointed work since the late '90s?
- 13 A Since nine- -- yes; 1997.
 - So you're aware, since you've been practicing so long, that the Crime Victims' Rights Act has been in place since 1998, correct?
 - A Well, I didn't know the year, but I know that there's been a crime victims' rights bill out there and that crime victims absolutely have the right to test—— you know, be notified about plea negotiations, to have input, and to appear at sentencing if they want.
 - Q Right. And -- and that has been in place in the Commonwealth since 1998. You don't dispute that, do you?
 - A If that's what the law -- when the law went into effect, I don't dispute that.

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              And you're aware that the Crime Victims' Right Act
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    -- Victims' Rights Act -- excuse me -- requires that victims
 3
    be notified of certain significant actions and proceedings
 4
    within the criminal and juvenile justice system -- systems
 5
    pertaining to their case?
 6
              Oh, if -- if that's what the -- are you talking
 7
    about the proposed amendment or the prior bill?
 8
               I'm sorry. The -- the act. The Crime Victims'
 9
    Rights Act from the 1990s.
10
                           They usually call that the Bill of
              THE COURT:
11
    Rights for Victims.
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              MS. BOLAND: Oh, okay.
13
              THE COURT: The Victims' Bill of Rights.
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              MS. BOLAND: Okay.
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              THE COURT:
                           It's another --
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              MS. BOLAND: Way of calling it?
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              THE COURT:
                           Yes.
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              MS. BOLAND:
                            Okay.
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    BY MS. BOLAND:
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               So the -- the Victims' Bill of Rights?
         Q
21
              Yes.
         Α
22
              Are you aware that it has that provision?
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              Yes.
         Α
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              Are you aware that it has a provision to not be
25
    excluded from any criminal proceeding?
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1 Α Absolutely. 2 Are you aware that it has a provision that provides 3 victims with the opportunity to submit prior comment before 4 pretrial disposition in cases involving certain bodily 5 injury? 6 Yes. Α 7 Are you aware that the victims -- the Bill of 8 Rights allows victims to submit a victim impact statement 9 that shall be considered by the Court in fashioning a 10 sentence? 11 Yes. And, in fact, it's done. Α 12 Are you aware that there are victims' advocates in 13 courthouses throughout the Commonwealth --14 THE COURT REPORTER: I'm sorry. Can you restate 15 that? 16 Sorry. MS. BOLAND: 17 THE COURT REPORTER: Slow down a little bit please. 18 BY MS. BOLAND: 19 Are you aware that there are victims' advocates in 20 courthouses around the Commonwealth as a result of the Crime 21 Victims' Rights Act? 22 Yes. I think in Philadelphia they were there 23 before the crimes victim -- you know, the Bill of Rights. 24 But, yes, I'm aware of the victims' advocates. They're --

they work directly with the prosecution. And most of them I

1 know, so --2 So there is already a framework in place to notify 3 victims of proceedings having to do with a criminal case? 4 Yes. Α 5 And there is a framework in place allowing them to 6 be heard? 7 Α Yes. 8 Earlier you talked about some of the difficulties 9 you will face potentially with discovery requests if the 10 amendment goes through, correct? 11 I want to take issue with one word, the word 12 potentially. We will face that under this law. There is no 13 doubt in my mind. 14 Q You have the ability to get cell phone records from 15 the cell phone provider. Isn't that right? 16 If this is enacted, the way that I see it is no. Α 17 No --18 I didn't ask a hypothetical. I'm just asking generally --19 20 Today? Α 21 -- right now you can subpoen a records from a cell 22 phone provider. Isn't that right? 23 If I know who the cell phone provider is. 24 If a prosecutor has cell phone records, medical Q 25 records, social media posts, anything that constitutes

A Yes. Key word is if they have it. Often in my experience, they do not have it.

Q And you at that point have the ability to subpoena a cell phone provider. Isn't that right?

A If I know who the cell phone provider is, I can subpoena it. Ordinarily in discovery you do not know that. They don't list who — the cell phone number of the person or the provider. That is why the way that you get that information is by bringing a motion in court because the prosecutor doesn't have that information.

Does -- there's nothing in the proposed amendment that prohibits you from filing a motion with the Court to obtain a court order to obtain that information, is there?

A To file the motion? No. But this -- what this law does is it gives the Commonwealth or the victim -- even if the DA says, I want to give this information over to the defense, this gives a constitutional right for the crime victim to say, I don't want my cell phone given out; I don't want my medical records. So I have the right to file a motion. Now that motion will be granted. Under this law, it won't be.

Q That's your interpretation of the law. Isn't that right, Mr. Greenblatt?

1 I don't see in reading this law if there's any Α 2 other interpretation of this that could be accepted. 3 Are you here today to offer an expert opinion as to 4 whether or not this law is self-executing on its face? 5 I'm -- I'm here to tell you looking at the law what 6 the practical effects I think of the law -- law will be. 7 Do you know the standard governing whether or not a 8 proposed amendment is self-executing or not? 9 Do I know the standards? No. I'm here to tell you 10 the practical --11 MR. GEHRING: Objection, Your Honor. 12 THE WITNESS: -- effects of this law. 13 MR. GEHRING: He didn't testify about that. 14 THE COURT: I thought that once an amendment was 15 accepted by the electorate, it -- it just becomes law. 16 MS. BOLAND: Your Honor, there's actually case law 17 to the contrary. There's the Tharp case. There can be 18 language contained in an amendment indicating that it's not 19 self-executing. And in this case --20 THE COURT: So that -- that --21 MS. BOLAND: -- it's not --22 THE COURT: That issue, though, would become a 23 whole part of more litigation to the courts. 24 MS. BOLAND: Perhaps, Your Honor. But it goes to

happen immediately. And that's not clear on the face of the amendment. In fact, the amendment provides --

THE COURT: The amendment will be -- if it's passed will be immediately part of our Constitution.

MS. BOLAND: That's not necessarily true under the Tharp case law, Your Honor, because there's language in --

THE COURT: I don't think -- I don't think he's an expert on whether or not a -- after the vote, whether it's self-executing or not.

THE WITNESS: I'm not.

THE COURT: My understanding is if the --

THE WITNESS: I'm definitely not, Your Honor.

THE COURT: -- electorate goes for it, it's part of our Constitution and you just work on it. Now people might start litigating the constitutionality of it, the am- -- ambiguity of it, that sort of thing. But that would just start to happen.

MS. BOLAND: Okay. There is case law, Your Honor, indicating that an amendment may not be self-executing depending on whether further action has to be taken. In this case, the proposed amendment says that it shall be further provided and as defined by the General Assembly. So in this case, it's not clear that the amendment would immediately go into effect.

BY MS. BOLAND:

1 So, Mr. Greenblatt, are you aware that the 2 amendment provides that the General Assembly is to pass 3 additional legislation further providing and further defining 4 rights under the amendment? 5 MR. GEHRING: Objection, Your Honor. 6 BY MS. BOLAND: Are you aware of that? 7 8 THE COURT: Basis? 9 MR. GEHRING: Your Honor, he didn't testify about 10 this. 11 THE COURT: He didn't. 12 MR. GEHRING: He's not offering himself as an 13 expert on this. 14 THE COURT: Do you know? THE WITNESS: Well, I read the bill that it says 15 16 that in there, that there's going to -- that there's -- so I 17 did read the bill. 18 THE COURT: I mean, to what extent then will the 19 General Assembly -- because this has to do with the -- the 20 manner in which courts are run, and that's the sole authority 21 and jurisdiction of the Supreme Court. 22 So by saying that, it seems to me that you're 23 yielding the entire criminal court system and how it's run to

the General Assembly which would be a violation of the

Constitution. So that's what I'm hearing you say when you

24

say that.

MS. BOLAND: Your Honor, that's -- it's not necessarily stepping on the toes of -- of the judiciary. It's not facially --

THE COURT: Anything -- anything of this you said could be ex- -- you know, it's not self-executing. We don't know, but the General Assembly will tell us whether it's self-executing and to what extent. And this is all how the courts are run. So how is this not stepping on the toes and the authority of the Supreme Court and all rulemaking for the courts?

MS. BOLAND: Your Honor, when it comes to definitions, there are areas, there are lines that can be drawn where the General Assembly can further provide definitions as to what's occurring, for instance, like how the law includes the definition of a victim, without necessarily encroaching on the territory of the judiciary. So I think a line can be drawn there. But the amendment does provide that the General Assembly is to take additional — additional action —

THE COURT: Can you tell us which parts of this amendment would be self- -- would immediately go into effect after election? Can -- are you able to tell us that now?

MS. BOLAND: I don't think it's clear, Your Honor, right now. I think that's part of what needs to be explored

in this matter because there is further action that does have to be taken under the amendment. It does say, As further provided and defined by the General Assembly.

So today as we're here at this proceeding, I don't think it's clear one way or the other. But I think that it's important to emphasize for this Court that it may not be immediate as the witness and as the petitioners are trying to make it seem. That was the only point I wanted to make with that, Your Honor.

THE COURT: The victims certainly won't know that, will they? They'll think that this amendment passed and now all these rights apply to them. Are you going to create confusion if it's not self-executing, all of this, to the victims?

MS. BOLAND: I -- I don't think that it would cause any great confusion. I think it's clear on its face that it says, As further provided and defined by the General Assembly. So I think it would be fair; I think both victims -- parties on both sides of the V would understand just by the plain language that further action needs to be taken.

So I think everyone has access to that language; it's plain on its face. And I don't think it's very — it's very confusing. I think a layperson could understand that perhaps more needs to be done to lay groundwork to fully implement the amendment.

1 THE COURT: Okay. Thank you, Ms. Boland. You can 2 continue your cross. 3 Thank you, Your Honor. MS. BOLAND: 4 BY MS. BOLAND: 5 Mr. Greenblatt, the -- the amendment does not 6 delete any language from the current Constitution, does it? 7 I don't know one way or another. Α 8 THE COURT: By the way, I've given up on time 9 limits. I think we just need to go through what we need to 10 go through here. Okay. 11 MR. BIZAR: Thank you, Your Honor. 12 MS. BOLAND: Thank you, Your Honor. 13 BY MS. BOLAND: 14 So the right to confront your accuser still appears 15 in the Constitution even if this amendment is passed? 16 Except that now there's another constitutional Α 17 right; the right to refuse to give over evidence is there. 18 There's a right to con- -- you're right, the right to 19 confrontation is still there. But under this, it can be 20 limited for the first time. And -- and that is severe. That is immediate. That is irreparable. 21 22 Do you doubt the ability of the Court to apply 23 these provisions consistently? 24 Absolutely. I've practiced law for 32 years. And Α 25

I can tell you in trial courts you get a variety of opinions

based on the variety of judges, based on the variety of places and jurisdictions that you try cases. That's why we have appellate courts. That's why we have the Supreme Court to apply clarity.

So I absolutely know from my experience of 32 years -- I've tried over a thousand cases. I have prepared over 10,000 cases. And I can tell you from one courtroom to the next, a lot of times in good faith judges have different opinions of what the law is; they apply it differently. And sometimes it gets overturned. Sometimes it doesn't. But that's why you have the appellate process.

In fact, any -- any case you have in criminal law where a verdict was overturned, where a motion to suppress was either granted or overturned means that there was a judge with a different opinion. Every single time. And throughout our juris- -- jurisprudence, I don't know how many cases last year that was, but tens of thousands.

- And throughout jurisprudence, additional case law is developed to help explain how these laws can be applied consistently and coextensively. Isn't that right? Isn't that the nature of the beast in terms of the law?
- A Yes. But what we're talking about here is irreparable harm that would be done.
- Q And, again, at all times you have the right to subpoena Instagram, to subpoena Google, to subpoena Facebook,

1 to subpoena medical records, to subpoena cell phone records; 2 you have that ability, supposing you know the source. Isn't 3 that right? 4 I -- I can't do it without the information that I Α 5 obtain through --6 I said supposing you know the source --7 MR. GEHRING: Objection, Your Honor. He hadn't 8 finished his answer. 9 THE WITNESS: I can't just put a general subpoena 10 out to Facebook to get information. They'll never give it to 11 I have to get the passcodes to unlock and get it. 12 only way to do that is to go to court and ask the judge to 13 order that the passcodes be -- be turned over. That's also 14 true of Instagram. 15 We talked about cell phone records. I don't know 16 who the cell phone provider, the cell phone number is until I 17 go into court and get it --18 BY MS. BOLAND: 19 0 And there's --20 -- so I can't --Α 21 -- nothing stopping you under this amendment from Q 22 going --23 THE COURT: Let him -- let him finish his answer. 24 MS. BOLAND: I apologize, Your Honor.

Okay. It's all right.

THE COURT:

THE WITNESS: Okay.

THE COURT: Continue, Mr. Greenblatt.

THE WITNESS: So -- so that goes for e-mails. I can't get prior e-mails unless I know who the e-mail address is and --

THE COURT: But, counsel, are you saying that every time you want this kind of information, you have to get a court order?

THE WITNESS: Every time I want the specifics, in other words, if I want somebody's Facebook posts, yes, Judge, I need to get it by court order. We have no way to get that information, because, sure, if somebody has public Facebook postings, we can get that information.

THE COURT: So then the victim would be required to be notified of that pretrial motion and then would say, I don't want to give it?

THE WITNESS: Yes. I mean, as currently constituted, that's the way that it works. I have to file a motion, and then the -- the alleged victim is notified. They're brought into court. And if a judge finds it relevant, because it's -- still a judge makes that determination, then the judge says, I'm ordering the passcodes turned over. I mean, I just had this in a case; turned over.

THE COURT: How will this amendment impact your

ability to continue doing that?

That's your question, right?

MS. BOLAND: Sure, Your Honor.

THE WITNESS: I won't be able to because under this, it says they can refuse that — refuse an interview, which I said is no problem; deposition, which really doesn't happen in criminal case law; or other discovery requests. That's a discovery request. I can't get it. I can't get cell phones, social media, medical records; can't get any of those things if this is passed and up— — and upheld or reversed. You know, we just don't know. There's no clarity on it.

But the harm -- what I'm here to say, Your Honor, is the harm is irreparable. With cell -- medical records, they might keep.

THE COURT: I'm going to let her continue her cross.

BY MS. BOLAND:

Q Mr. Greenblatt, you just defined for the Court what your understanding of the word or the phrase discovery request means. Isn't that right?

A Yes.

Q But, in fact, the law provides that it's up to the General Assembly to further -- further provide and define terms like that. Isn't that true? It says that in the

amendment?

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- A It might say that in the amendment, but I'm just telling you the way discovery requests are seen and the ambiguities in the law.
- Q And you just said that there are no interviews, typically you have no right to an interview in the criminal justice process, right, of the victim?
- A There's two things you said. There's absolutely the ability of a criminal defense attorney to go talk to anyone in the case. There's --
- Q I'm sorry. And I apologize for cutting you off, but I just want to sort of --
- 13 MR. GEHRING: Objection, Your Honor.
- 14 BY MS. BOLAND:
 - Q -- abbreviate so I can ask my question.
- 16 A Well, I'm trying to answer your question as stated.

 17 But there's no absolute right if -- if a person doesn't want

 18 to talk to an attorney or a police officer, they don't have

 19 to talk to them.
 - Q Exactly.
- 21 THE COURT: Or a witness.
- 22 THE WITNESS: Or witness.
- 23 BY MS. BOLAND:
 - Q Or the police. And there are no depositions in the criminal process was your testimony, correct?

- A Right. Sometimes there's -- it's done concurrently. There might be a concurrent civil lawsuit. I don't know how this would affect that. I'm here to talk about the third part.
- Q You don't know how that would affect it, and you don't know if the term discovery request solely pertains to --

THE COURT REPORTER: I'm sorry, Ms. Boland. Would you please slow down and repeat your question?

MS. BOLAND: I'm sorry.

BY MS. BOLAND:

- And you don't know if the term discovery request solely pertains to the civil process, do you? Perhaps that's what the meaning behind that phrase.
- A I can't imagine they would have a crime victims bill that only went to the civil process. It would have to be to the criminal process. I'm not a constitutional scholar, but when they're talking about the discovery process, it would have to be to the criminal. If there's something that's in there that I didn't read, point me to it, but but I see this as affecting the criminal process. That's what I'm here to talk about.
- Q Sure. But there are no depositions in the criminal process, right?
 - A No.

- 1 And so with discovery requests, the -- the 2 amendment doesn't say that victims have the right to refuse 3 court orders, does it? 4 I think it does. Α 5 Can you point to that language? Sure. 6 Α 7 THE COURT: I think that's what he's been 8 testifying about all along. 9 BY MS. BOLAND: 10 It says that it has the right to -- victims have 11 the right to refuse interviews, depositions, and discovery 12 requests. There's not an additional comma to that sentence 13 that says court orders or search warrants, is there? 14 But they -- well, I'm not talking about search warrants. I'm talking about court orders. It does say that 15 16 in there, discovery requests. It's a discovery request. 17 They can refuse. 18 A discovery request is different from a court 19 order. So if you as a defense attorney issue a discovery 20 request to a victim and they say no, that's one thing. But 21 on the other hand, if a court issues an order directing a 22 victim to turn over certain information, that's different,
 - A It's different, but a judge can say they don't want to do it based on this law. And right now the judge won't;

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isn't it?

they'll order --1 2 And that's your speculation about what you think 3 might occur --4 I'm trying to --Α 5 -- if the amendment is passed? -- say that is the irreparable harm of this law, 6 7 so, of course, there's some speculation in it. 8 And it's based upon your unilateral interpretations 9 of the law without guidance from the General Assembly --10 isn't that right -- or from the courts? 11 The General Assembly and the courts. And that's what's I'm saying; there's irreparable harm in this bill that 12 13 -- that -- if you -- this injunction is granted --14 THE COURT: Use the microphone, sir. 15 THE WITNESS: If this injunction is granted, the courts will straighten it all out. They'll give us guidance. 16 17 The Legislature will give us guidance. And then we can act 18 accordingly on to what we're told the rules are. But not 19 before then. There's irreparable harm here. BY MS. BOLAND: 20 21 Well, you're not aware of whether or not this is 22 self-executing, so you don't know if this will immediately go 23 into effect or if we will have guidance before it becomes 24 effective. Sitting here today, you don't know that, do you?

I -- I don't know what the Legislature will do in

1	the future. No, I don't know what the Legislature will do in		
2	the future. I'm looking at what I have in front of me right		
3	now.		
4	Q And just a few final questions, sir. Did you		
5	conduct any sort of studies or investigative reports in		
6	preparation of your testimony today?		
7	A Any studies? No.		
8	Q Did you write collect any data or perform any		
9	investigations in advance of your testimony today?		
10	A No. I'm giving you a practitioner's point of view.		
11	Q Have you conducted any studies on the impact of the		
12	Crime Victims' Rights Act from 1998? Have you done any		
13	studies or any research, or have you collected any data about		
14	the impact that that act has had on the Commonwealth since		
15	its enactment in 1998?		
16	A No, I haven't.		
17	MS. BOLAND: I have no further questions. Thank		
18	you, Your Honor.		
19	THE COURT: All right. As long as you touch on		
20	different areas at this point, counsel.		
21	MR. WITHERS: I'll be very brief, Your Honor.		
22	THE COURT: Okay.		
23	CROSS-EXAMINATION		
24	BY MR. WITHERS:		
25	Q Good morning, Mr. Greenblatt.		

1 Good morning. Α 2 I'm Scot Withers. I represent the intervenors in 3 this matter on behalf of the respondents. 4 You're familiar with the Rules of Criminal 5 Procedure, are you not? 6 Yes. Α And Rule 573 of criminal procedural rules controls 7 8 pretrial discovery and inspection, correct? 9 Α Correct. 10 And under those rules, you have no right as a 11 criminal defendant to interview any victim, do you? 12 No right? No. Α And you have no right to interview any witness, do 13 Q 14 you? 15 No right? No. Α 16 And you have no right to compulsory process, do Q 17 you? 18 Can you explain what you mean by --Α 19 You have a right to compel deposition. Q 20 Α Correct. 21 You have no --Q 22 THE COURT: Just depositions, right? 23 BY MR. WITHERS: 24 -- no right to compel interrogatories? Q 25 THE COURT: Isn't there -- isn't there a part of

our Constitution that has compulsory process which gives them the right to compulsory process --

MR. WITHERS: They -- they can compel witness -- they can compel the witness to appear at trial, but this is pretrial, Your Honor.

THE COURT: At this point you are just repeating what Ms. Boland said, so let's try to hit some new areas.

Okay?

MR. WITHERS: Thank you, Your Honor.

THE COURT: All right.

BY MR. WITHERS:

You referenced -- you testified that when -- if -- if you're not allowed to obtain evidence directly from a victim in terms of cell phone records, et cetera, that you have to go -- at presently you have to request a -- you have to file a motion with the Court, correct?

A Yes, sir.

Q Okay. And when you file that motion with the Court -- let's say you're requesting a bank statement -- the Court is required to undertake an analysis to determine whether the rights of the victim, the privacy rights of the victim and privacy in their financial records guaranteed under the Pennsylvania and United States Constitution -- they have to balance that versus the criminal defendant's rights, correct?

A They have to see if it's -- they have to do a

1 relevancy test.
2 Q They
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4 microphone.
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6 relevancy test.
7 BY MR. WITHERS:
8 Q And i
9 evidence to be
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Q They have to do a --

THE COURT: If you wouldn't mind talking into the microphone.

THE WITNESS: Oh, yeah. There has to be a relevancy test.

Q And if — and if it's relevant and you want that evidence to be disclosed and procured through a subpoena, they also have to do a balancing test regarding the privacy rights of the records that you're seeking versus the rights of the criminal defendant, correct?

A It's not really -- that's not the balancing test
they do. We have a right -- the criminal defendant has a
right to present a defense and a right to investigate a case.
So if they can show that it may be relevant, then it's up to
the judge on whether or not the judge will grant that.

- Q And the judge has to determine whether that right would violate any rights of the victim, correct?
 - A Yes.
- Q Okay. And the victim, just like any other citizen in the United -- in the United States and in Pennsylv- -- Pennsylvania, has a constitutional right to privacy, correct?
 - A Yes. Every person has --
 - Q Yes. So the courts are already balancing

1 constitutional rights of victims versus constitutional rights 2 of defendants in determining whether you get the information 3 that you're seeking to get. Is that correct? 4 Sir, this changes that dramatically. 5 I'm not asking you if it changes that. I'm --6 Α 7 I'm asking currently --Q 8 MR. GEHRING: Objection, Your Honor. 9 THE COURT: Sustained. Yes. Your objection is 10 sustained. 11 He's trying to answer your question. 12 THE WITNESS: Sir, this changes that dramatically. 13 For the first time, this says that someone who's a victim or an alleged victim can refuse that request. That's never been 14 done before. 15 16 MR. WITHERS: Your Honor, I move to strike as 17 nonresponsive. I didn't ask him what the prospective effect 18 would be. 19 THE COURT: That motion is denied. 20 MR. WITHERS: I asked him the current --21 THE COURT: It's absolutely in response to your 22 question. 23 BY MR. WITHERS: 24 But currently the courts balance the constitutional Q

right to privacy against your request for discovery?

1	А	Yes.
2	Q	That's already going on?
3		I have no further questions, Your Honor.
4		THE COURT: Counsel, did you have any cross?
5		MS. BOLAND: Nothing further, Your Honor.
6		MR. ENERSON: No, Your Honor.
7		THE COURT: Okay.
8		MR. GEHRING: Your Honor, may I ask a few questions
9	on redire	ct?
10		THE COURT: Do you have to?
11		(Laughter.)
12		THE COURT: Are they essential, absolutely?
13		Go ahead. Go ahead. You can do it.
14		(Laughter.)
15		MR. GEHRING: I'll be very brief, Your Honor.
16		THE COURT: It has to be anything related to the
17	cross. A	ll right.
18		MR. GEHRING: Yes, Your Honor.
19		THE COURT: Not a new line of questioning.
20		MR. GEHRING: Absolutely, Your Honor.
21		REDIRECT EXAMINATION
22	BY MR. GE	HRING:
23	Q	Mr. Greenblatt, you were asked about whether you
24	were aware	e of what's been called the Victims' Bill of Rights?
25	А	Yes.

- 1 The Victims' Bill of Rights, are those 2 constitutional rights? 3 It's a -- it's a law that passed -- I'm sorry. 4 It's a law that passed giving crime victims, people -- you 5 know, mostly the right to be -- to be involved in the plea 6 negotiation process, to come to sentencing, to be aware of 7 any parole hearings. 8 Does Marsy's Law make these rights constitutional 9 rights? 10 Well, they're con- -- yeah. This is an amendment to the Constitution. 11 12 And does the Victim Bill of Rights have any 13 14 Α Absolutely not.
 - provision regarding being able to refuse discovery?

 - Does it have any provision that would limit cross-examination?
- 17 Α No.

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- Does it have any provision that would affect your -- your ability to negotiate effectively and knowingly a plea with a prosecutor?
- Absolutely not.
- You were asked about whether you can get cell phone records, for -- for instance, from a -- from a provider. getting cell phone records -- how often have you been able to get cell phone records from a provider?

1 A From the provider? If I have the proper 2 information, that is, who the provider is, the cell phone 3 phone number, and who the provider is, because the cell phone 4 number doesn't say who the provider is, you go to court and 5 you get the records. I mean, but I can tell you this: I

6 rarely get that turned over from the prosecution. It is
7 incumbent on the defense to do the investigation.

Q Are -- do you get discovery of -- of documents -- I'm talking about non-data, nonelectronic records. You get discovery of documents that are relevant to cases, don't you?

A Yes.

Q Can you get documents in possession of a victim?
Can you get those from an outside provider?

A No. I mean, if they're e-mails, you need to know the e-mail addresses. And then you need to, you know, request that the computer be mirrored. And -- and then there's -- the documents get extracted. And a lot of times there's -- obvious- -- not a lot of times. All the time there's a relevancy test.

Q Okay. Can you get videos; for instance, security camera videos? Would you be able to get those from an outside provider?

A No. As I told you, in the example I gave, if a store owner was robbed, you know, and you have somebody who says, Look, it's not me and there's video, they could say,

1 I'm not turning over the video. The -- the only way I can 2 get it is by subpoena. 3 THE COURT: Because they're directly impacted? 4 THE WITNESS: Yes. 5 THE COURT: And they might refuse? 6 THE WITNESS: Yes, Your Honor. 7 BY MR. GEHRING: 8 Mr. Greenblatt, you were asked about some language 9 in the amendment about implementing legislation. And so --10 and it was posited whether this was going to go into effect 11 immediately. Do you remember that? 12 Yes. Α 13 Will -- assuming that is correct, that -- that --14 that there will be a question about whether it goes into effect immediately, will the uncertainty of whether the law 15 16 is in effect -- will that create its own set of problems? 17 Yes. Any -- any uncertainty is bad. And there 18 would be uncertainty. 19 Would you think judges will -- will interpret that -- those -- that language uniformly from judge to judge? 20 21 No. As I said, in all good faith, judges 22 reach different decisions based on the same set of facts and 23 circumstances. 24 You were asked about, you know, whether court Q

orders are covered by the language of Marsy's Law. Do you

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1 remember that? 2 Yes. Α 3 With the -- with the gist, I think, being that the 4 -- the Marsy's Law doesn't necessarily prevent a judge from 5 issuing a court order to obtain discovery. Was that your 6 interpretation of that questioning? 7 I think that's what it was about. 8 Can -- in your -- in your experience, can a judge 9 issue an order that violates the constitutional rights of 10 someone? 11 Absolutely not. Α 12 So if a person -- if a victim has the right to 13 refuse a discovery request, in your experience, could a judge 14 issue an order that would overrule that? 15 I don't -- I don't believe so. No. They can't --16 you can't -- a judge doesn't have the right to go outside the 17 Constitution. 18 And you -- do you get discovery through subpoenas 0 19 as well? 20 Α Yes. 21 Is a subpoena a court order? Q 22 Yes. Α 23 MR. GEHRING: That's all I have, Your Honor. 24 THE COURT: Thank you. 25 So is there any recross based on this, counsel?

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MR. WITHERS: No, Your Honor. Thank you.

Thank you, Your Honor.

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THE COURT:

THE WITNESS:

All right. You can step down, sir.

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So we'll continue now with oral THE COURT:

argument. Stick to the salient points at this point.

MR. BIZAR: Sure.

THE COURT: And then you'll have your full opportunity to respond and make any additional arguments that you -- you have too.

> MS. BOLAND: Thank you.

MR. BIZAR: I just want to follow up, Your Honor, on a couple points that you raised. You asked I think specifically whether there was any case for the proposition that serving -- that the Secretary cannot certify election results; has -- has that happened before in Pennsylvania? And we -- we don't have a case for the -- for that specific proposition. But the case Costa versus Cortes, which is a Judge Brobson decision, in a different posture because in that case, the General Assembly had pulled the ballot question, but it provides guidance.

THE COURT: Can I have the --

MR. BIZAR: Yes. 143 A.3rd 430. And in that case, Jonathan Marks had testified on behalf of the Secretary. And Judge Brobson was addressing that issue and said that -- that the Secretary had no duty -- no authority and, thus, no duty

to canvass and compute votes cast on a question that's not before the electorate. And he's citing to the specific part of the Election Code that you had pointed to which is this — the mandatory language in — in that code.

So it's not exactly the same, but it's close. I think it provides guidance, and we wanted to call it to your attention.

The second issue I wanted to address just before I turn back to the balance of the harms, balance of hardships is the issue that came up during Mr. Greenblatt's testimony which is the issue of whether the amendment becomes self-executing.

The Supreme Court has addressed this. And we put it in our petitioners' opening brief at page 11, the CW versus Tharp case, which I think Ms. Boland mentioned; 754 A.2d 1251. And the pinpoint cite, Your Honor, is 1254. And the net — the gist of that is that a constitutional amendment becomes effective upon approval by the electorate unless it contains a specific date that defers its effectiveness.

THE COURT: That's what I had read. That's why I was a little confused.

MR. BIZAR: Right.

THE COURT: All right.

MR. BIZAR: And so that -- those constitutional

rights are self-executing, and they're im- -- applied and interpreted by the case law.

And it's important to note -- and I think this is what -- what the last bit of questioning of Mr. Greenblatt was getting to as well -- the rights in the Constitution will always trump any executing legislation that the General Assembly puts in place. So these -- the -- the amendment would have the effect of putting these rights in -- in place regardless of what the General Assembly may later do.

But I do think that Your Honor's point about this stepping on the toes of the Court, of the Supreme Court because the General Assembly is essentially taking judicial rulemaking to itself is exactly correct. And that's what happened in the Bergdoll I case where it was found to be unconstitutional, a violation of the Constitution. So I wanted to add those points to — to the discussion because they're timely right now.

So we're going to get to the likelihood of success on the merits and the irreparable harm issue imminently. But I want to -- I may not have rebuttal, and I want to just address the arguments that the Secretary is going to raise. I know Your Honor can follow along. And I want to just address them now because it's appropriate to do that.

I'm quite confident that the Secretary is going to
-- to say that voters will not show up if an injunction is

issued. I want to say, Your Honor, that that is entirely speculative. The Secretary has conducted no study to determine what makes voters choose to vote or not choose to vote. And Judge Brobson actually grappled with that question in that Costa versus Cortes case as well, in a different part of case.

The Secretary would need expert testimony, just not -- it wouldn't be enough to rely on Mr. Marks's say-so on that score. And it hasn't been studied. It's entirely speculative.

Second, elections go on with court challenges all the time. There's a long history of that in this Court and in the Supreme Court. And we still have elections. And there's no evidence that court challenges to whatever it may be, ballot questions or otherwise, impact voter turnout. The least disruptive thing we argue to do here is to maintain the status quo which is to enter the prohibitory injunction.

In addition, there have been a significant number of ads urging voters to vote for Marsy's Law. We all see them. They're all over the — the various social media and — and the mainline media. There's no ads about an injunction, nothing saying that the Court will decide whether to count the votes or not count the votes. So I think that the chances are very high that voter turnout will be unaffected.

No one is going to tell voters -- and on our -- our side as well and -- and from the rest of the interested parties in this case, no one is going to tell voters not to show up, not to cast their votes. And there are a lot of other issues that are on the ballot: retention of judges, municipal elections, school board elections. If you looked at the ballot questions, there -- there are many, many questions that will attract voters to the polls, we believe. So I just wanted to -- to make that -- those points.

Let me turn to the likelihood of prevailing on the merits which is one of the -- another one of the critical elements that's in play here.

And the key -- the key thing to bear in mind -- and I know this is very familiar to you, Your Honor -- is that we don't have to show that we are going to establish our claims entirely, that we're going to win. It's different than the federal court standard. We have to show that there are substantial questions at issue here. And constitutional questions, substantial legal questions involving constitutional challenges to determine parties' rights are almost always considered to be substantial legal questions.

It's settled law in Pennsylvania that constitutional challenges to legislative enactments raise — and I'm quoting; raise important issues that are deserving of serious consideration. They're the type of challenges that

often get injunctions granted.

So let's turn to the merits. The question we raise in this lawsuit is whether this amendment should have been presented to voters for separate votes, right, whether Article XI, Section 1 requires that the amendment be presented to voters so that they can vote separately for those changes they like and reject the changes they don't like. So it's not a combo meal, to be -- to inject a little bit of levity in this very serious matter.

Now the respondent and the intervenor here claim that there's no separate vote required because the amendment in question only relates to the rights of crime victims. It has a single common denominator because all of the changes are jammed into that one new proposed section, 9.1, and packaged as a single amendment, the Crime Victims' Rights Amendment. They're only a single subject. They have the common denominator.

And under the subject matter test set forth in the Supreme Court's case, the Grimaud case, which we all agree is an important case that sets the framework for looking at this issue, they -- they've satisfied the single subject test.

THE COURT: That was bail, wasn't it?

MR. BIZAR: Yes, it was.

THE COURT: One word --

MR. BIZAR: Yes.

THE COURT: -- bail. Even though it contained a number, they were able to keep it to bail.

MR. BIZAR: Bail. That's right. Not the case here.

So their argument, Your Honor, I submit to you, elevates form over substance. And it — they also take — go to great pains to take Grimaud and misread it or mischaracterize it. Grimaud talks about the fact — or talks about whether the amendment in question facially affects other constitutional provisions. But it also talks about whether it patently affects other constitutional provisions.

Grimaud directs the Court to analyze -- and I'm quoting -- the substantive effect on the Constitution. It directs the Court -- and I'm quoting again -- examining the content, purpose, and effect of the proposed amendment. You look at the substantive effect, not the superficialities, not just at -- at face.

It's not limited to literal instances where the amendment says it's intended to only apply to two articles. If that — if that were the case, then the entire provision of the Constitution would be toothless.

And we have to remember why this provision exists. This provision exists because we did not want the Legislature to logroll. We did not want the Legislature to pass huge stat- -- huge amendments to the people's document, to the

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    people's organic charter. We wanted the electors to be able
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    to vote on amendments and to have those amendments presented
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    to them so they can exercise --
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              THE COURT:
                          I never really understood the analogy
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    of logrolling.
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              MR. BIZAR: I don't either.
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              THE COURT:
                         Okay.
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              MR. BIZAR: But it's in the cases.
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              THE COURT: I'm not the only one then?
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              MR. BIZAR: It's in the cases.
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              THE COURT: I was thinking of a snowball -- but a
12
    log?
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              MR. BIZAR: I don't -- I don't -- I don't know
    where they get it, you know.
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              THE COURT: All right. So I thought maybe you
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    understood --
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              MR. BIZAR: No. No. I --
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              THE COURT: -- the term.
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              MR. BIZAR: I have no light to shed on that. I'm
20
    sorry.
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              THE COURT:
                          Okay. I'm glad I'm not the only one.
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                          You're -- but it's -- it's in the
              MR. BIZAR:
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    cases --
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              THE COURT:
                          I know.
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              MR. BIZAR: -- and we all know what it means, I
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think. It means something like what's happening here.

(Laughter.)

MR. BIZAR: So the question — the question is — you know, you have to look at what is happening in this amendment. And the amendment affects three articles, eight sections, one schedule to the Pennsylvania Constitution. It — it recognizes this by touching on and referring to multiple rights.

Now, some of those rights may have a common objective, which is the test that the respondent proposes, or they may be sufficiently interrelated. The right to notice and the opportunity to be heard, you know, that could even relate to the definition of a victim; the opportunity to consult with law enforcement. Those are rights that the provision — that the amendment gives.

But those rights have nothing to do with the prompt restitution of property or the return of property -- prompt restitution or the return -- prompt return of property. They have nothing to do with the General Assembly effectively making rules to define victim or to do other things down the road, to define how due process is going to be -- to be given.

They -- they have taken different topics, and they are trying to connect those topics simply because they relate in the broadest sense to crime victims. But they don't

relate to each other. They establish distinct and separate rights in many respects. Maybe some may be related, but overall, the 15 new rights and the other processes that are set forth are distinct.

So while we don't dispute that the subject matter test applies and while we don't dispute that in a case like Grimaud where they all did relate tightly to bail, that subject matter test would be met, in this case, there are more than one subject, more than one right that are being affected by this amendment.

And so that has to be a situation where the patent effect, where the substantive effect, where looking at the content and purpose and effect on the Constitution satisfies the test that Grimaud establishes, which comes ultimately from the Bergdoll case because Grimaud cites the Prison Society case and Prison Society cites Bergdoll. The respondents suggest that Bergdoll is not good law. It's still good law. It's still part of this overall framework for looking at these -- at these -- THE COURT: It's interesting how --

MR. BIZAR: -- issues.

THE COURT: -- divided the Supreme Court is on this

issue --

MR. BIZAR: It is.

THE COURT: -- over the years.

MR. BIZAR: There's been a lot of opportunity for them to speak about it. And I suspect we'll probably get there at some point in this case as well.

But the -- the key thing is that while there are some rights here that have common objectives, there are quite a few that really don't. You know, the right to -- to have safety considered in setting bail, what does that have to do with the right to refuse discovery? What does it have to do with the right to restitution? What does that have to do to the right to the return of property?

And you can go through it line by line and just mix and match. There's so many different rights in this omnibus amendment which is exactly the opposite of what the framers envisioned with Section -- Article XI, Section 1.

The new rights that are being given are not so sufficiently interrelated as to constitute a single subject. They're separate, and they have to be viewed as separate. And they have to — the electorate has to be given the opportunity to vote on them.

Okay. We've -- we've addressed a lot of these points in the briefs, Your Honor. We know that this Court -- THE COURT: And I have read them very carefully.

All --

MR. BIZAR: And we --

THE COURT: All of the filings I've read very

carefully.

MR. BIZAR: And we appreciate that.

Let me turn to irreparable harm. What's the irreparable harm here? It's one — another one of the six elements. And Mr. Greenblatt testified about some of that. His testimony on the balance of the harms or balance of the hardships and his testimony on irreparable harm bled together. And I'm not going to repeat that. I think Your Honor got that and the questions were on point.

I want to focus on another aspect of irreparable harm here, and that is the irreparable harm to the electorate's rights as voters to vote separately on amendments to their document, to the -- the Constitution.

The right to vote is the basic bedrock of our political system. The cases say that. And neither the General Assembly nor the courts are entitled to erode or distort or disregard any provision of the Constitution. And they can't be -- can't sacrifice those provisions for political purposes. I'm not suggesting the Court is, but I'm -- I'm suggesting the importance of that document, of the Constitution, and that it's enshrining of the right to vote.

So any action by the General Assembly that threatens fundamental rights like the right to vote constitutes under the case law of the Commonwealth immediate and irreparable harm automatically.

And here, this proposed November 5, 2019 ballot question that requires voters in Pennsylvania to vote yes or no on a multifaceted question, an amendment that amends many existing provisions: three articles, eight sections, and the schedule of the Constitution, thereby impacting many different rights and establishing new rights with a single yes or no vote, that affects immediately and irreparably the electors' rights.

Now I think you recognized at the start this morning how sensitive these issues are. And I -- I could not agree more. We -- we can all understand the importance of victims' rights. We can all get behind that as a concept. But when we sacrifice the electors' voting rights, when we sacrifice the citizens' rights in the Constitution which are not entitled to be ignored -- literal compliance with the Constitution is required under our law -- when we sacrifice those rights, every voter, every citizen suffers.

And so we're here asking the Court to maintain the status quo, to enter a prohibitory injunction that would allow us to proceed with this case very quickly. And we're committed to do that.

I think the intervenors — crime victim intervenors said we filed this at the eleventh hour, it deprived them of their right to respond. We did no such thing. We'll respond quickly. They'll respond quickly. We're not trying to avoid

getting to this on the merits. We agreed everybody could intervene. The more, the merrier, subject to your approval. But we will move --

THE COURT: As many voices that can be heard on an issue like this is important.

MR. BIZAR: Agreed. And -- and we feel that way. So we -- and I think there are more amicus briefs coming, I suspect, as well.

But on this issue, Your Honor, we think that the key is to preserve the status quo. And what we're seeking is an injunction that would do that. Not disenfranchise anybody because the votes will be kept. And not, you know, change anything or require the Secretary to do anything that they can't do, because the Secretary can do these things. They're talented people. They're more than capable of doing it. We recognize money has been spent here, but we don't think that when you balance it out, constitutional rights and money are the same. The constitutional rights trump the money every time.

Thank you very much for your courtesy. And I'll -THE COURT: You're welcome.

MR. BIZAR: If I have a need for rebuttal, I'll ask, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Is there any additional argument that would -- counsel, that you want to make because -- do you

1 think it was covered enough? 2 MR. CHRISTY: Yes, Your Honor. 3 THE COURT: Okay. All right. 4 So now it's your turn to make your case, and you 5 have the time you need. 6 MS. BOLAND: Thank you, Your Honor. 7 THE COURT: You're welcome. 8 MS. BOLAND: Your Honor, neither this Court --9 THE COURT: Can I ask just one question? 10 MS. BOLAND: Oh, sure. 11 THE COURT: So what about the fact that you would consider making a constitutional amendment that's impossible 12 13 to fulfill? Like the restitution, for example -- you're 14 going to force individuals to pay restitution; they shall --15 when you can't get blood from a -- from a stone. So what --16 what would the General Assembly say about a section in an 17 amendment that would be impossible to execute? 18 MS. BOLAND: Your Honor, I can't read the mind of 19 the General Assembly. I'm not sure if -- how they would 20 interpret that particular provision. And I'm not sure that I 21 agree that it would be necessarily impossible. 22

THE COURT: For every -- every restitution. I have been a judge for -- for 12 years, and I have ordered restitution many a time. And these folks don't have any money.

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1 MS. BOLAND: I see. 2 THE COURT: But --3 MS. BOLAND: I see your -- your point, Your Honor. 4 I think I misunderstood. 5 Yeah. So it's like an impossibility THE COURT: 6 that this constitution -- is there any law on -- you know, 7 doing a Constitution that's impossible to execute -- a 8 constitutional amendment? 9 MS. BOLAND: I --10 THE COURT: Restitution really got my goat, you 11 know. 12 MS. BOLAND: I think -- I think that's, you know, a 13 valid question to ask. But I don't think that the amendment 14 is to be construed to absurdity. So I think that the courts 15 and the General Assembly would have to interpret it 16 reasonably. And, of course, if there was no, you know, blood 17 to get from the stone, I think that would be the end of it. 18 I'm not -- I'm not sure that anyone would try to take it to 19 some other type of absurd degree. 20 THE COURT: But it's going to be in the 21 Constitution as an inviolate right, that you shall get 22 restitution. And these people are not going to get 23 restitution in most of these cases.

one creative resolution could be some sort of property lien.

MS. BOLAND: Off the top of my head, Your Honor,

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But, again, that's in -- within the purview --

THE COURT: These are people in jail. They have substance abuse problems, mental health problems. You know, they're not educated. They don't have jobs. They have felony convictions. There's just — they're not going to get — you're not going to get anything from them.

MS. BOLAND: I do understand your concern, Your Honor. And I think that concern applies when it comes to judgments in civil cases. And, you know, judgments are provided for in the Constitution. And so I think that --

THE COURT: I just have a -- I just have a --

MS. BOLAND: -- same concern --

THE COURT: I have a -- I have a concern about setting up hopes of victims around the state with this amendment that won't be able to be fulfilled. That's -- you know, I feel concerned about.

MS. BOLAND: I understand, Your Honor. I think in

-- in a lot of cases, there would be a possibility for

restitution and the victims wouldn't be let down. Sure. I'm

-- in some cases, there may not be.

But I think the point is that the amendment isn't to be construed to absurdity and that the courts would be able to implement this and interpret it in a way that it would respect all -- all the interests involved. So that -- that's my -- my thought to that. And the General Assembly

does have a duty to further define things under the act, so maybe we would get --

THE COURT: This is not an act. This is an -MS. BOLAND: I'm sorry, Your Honor; the proposed
amendment -- we would get more definitive guidance on that
point.

But the main point I would like to start off with, Your Honor, is that neither this Court nor the Supreme Court has ever held that a preliminary injunction is necessary in this context of a ballot question proposing a constitutional amendment. There is no precedent supporting the petitioners' request at all.

In fact, oppositely, even in Bergdoll, even in Pennsylvania Prison Society where the Court ultimately ruled that those amendments were unconstitutional, preliminary injunctions were denied. And it's because of the availability of a remedy after the fact.

The Pennsylvania Supreme Court affirmed this principle in Bergdoll. The Court reiterated principles that it stated in Stander that the question of constitutionality is justiciable after the voters have adopted a provision because the people can't constitutionalize --

THE COURT: Counsel, wouldn't you --

MS. BOLAND: -- something that's unconstitution- --

THE COURT: -- suggest that the scope and sweep of

this amendment is completely different than any precedent we have from the Supreme Court and the Commonwealth Court on ballot questions and that it's hard to compare those cases to this particular matter? I have found that it's very fact-sensitive, these -- and there's nothing like this that we can find in the law. MS. BOLAND: I -- I respectfully disagree, Your In Mellow, this Court, in an opinion authored by, I

Honor. In Mellow, this Court, in an opinion authored by, I believe, Judges Leadbetter and Simpson, recognized that in the 1960s, there were bulk amendments made to the Constitution. Those bulk amendments are still on the books.

THE COURT: Can I have that cite?

MS. BOLAND: At -- it's Mellow. And Mellow is -- it's Mellow v. Pizzingrilli. And the cite is 800 A.2d -- A.2d 350. And it --

THE COURT: Thank you.

MS. BOLAND: No problem, Your Honor. And in that case, the Court recounted the history of the separate vote requirement in the Constitution and noted that in the 1960s, there were bulk amendments to our organic charter and these bulk amendments contain many substantive changes. And this Court --

THE COURT: Do you remember what the one was in Mellow? Do you remember what the bulk amendment was in Mellow?

MS. BOLAND: In Mellow, it had to do with vacancies after reapportionment. So that was the issue before the bar in Mellow. But the Court did go through the history and recognize that in the 1960s, these bulk amendments existed and these bulk amendments made numerous substantive changes to the law. And the Court recognized that an amendment can have many different parts.

And in Grimaud, which is the case in which the Supreme Court finally adopted a standard to apply in this case — there was no standard before Grimaud. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court expressly said that they are adopting this standard in Grimaud.

In -- in Grimaud, it had to do with bail. The issue had to do with bail. And a very similar was -- argument was made as the petitioners are making, that it implicitly amends all of these different sorts of rights. But the Court adopted a new standard and said it has to facially affect those rights. And it also said that the parts have to be interrelated.

And by adopting that standard, saying the parts have to be interrelated, the Court is acknowledging that an amendment can contain more than one change, that it can contain parts. And that's exactly what we have here.

In the PA Prison Society case, which there was no plurality, there -- the amendment was ruled unconstitutional.

It had to do with pardons. On one hand, it reconstituted the board. And on the other, it said that there has to be unanimous vote for someone to get a pardon. It wasn't towards a single purpose. It was a single topic, you know, the Board of Probation and Parole, but it wasn't working towards a single purpose. On one hand, it's reconstituting. On the other hand, it's changing the circumstances in which someone can get a pardon.

In this case, every single part relates to the same purpose; it's advancing victims' rights. It's not -- it's the same goal. And in Grimaud, the Court adopted a common-purpose standard. Specifically, the -- the Court said it has to be interrelated and then it used a -- uses -- used phrases -- excuse me, Your Honor -- such as common-purpose formulation, consistent and workable whole, rationally related to a single purpose and plan.

And in this case, all of those parts, every single part of the amendment really does work towards the same purpose and plan, and that's advancing victims' rights.

Now the petitioners can pick at whether or not those -- those rights policy-wise are good or not, but that's not the question that -- or that's not the standard that was adopted by Grimaud. It wasn't if the parts are workable. It wasn't if they're realistic. The -- the -- the standard is simply whether or not it works towards a single purpose, a

single goal. And here it does. And just because it has different parts doesn't render it per se unconstitutional.

If it was per se unconstitutional because it contained many parts, well, then all of those bulk amendments from the '60s -- then they must be per se unconstitutional. Then -- then the amendments that this Court has upheld in Mellow and Grimaud, they would have been held to be per se unconstitutional because they contain different parts that the Court had to consider.

So the point I'm trying to make, Your Honor, is just because there are parts, just because there are semicolons, just because there's one — more than one new right created by this proposed amendment doesn't mean that it's unconstitutional. The question is whether all of those things relate to a single purpose. And all of those things in this case, they do relate to a single purpose.

And back to the remedy, Your Honor, that's why, you know, there is no precedent for an injunction in — in a case like this. In Bergdoll and Prison Society, the — the PIs were denied. Then the late — the amendments were later — later held to be unconstitutional. And this makes really good sense. And it's because greater harm will result to the Commonwealth if an injunction is issued but if at the end of the day we win the case.

There -- petitioners said that there is no

publicity surrounding this PI hearing, that there's no notice about it. This morning when I was getting ready, I saw this hearing advertised two times on the one hour news block that — that was playing. So the public is aware of this proceeding.

If an injunction is issued, even as to certifying the ballot -- and we do have a witness here. And you can take notice of what he was going to testify to as to all of the harm that would befall the Commonwealth should this -- the certification be withheld.

THE COURT: The petitioners agreed to stipulate to all the harms in terms of costs and whatnot. So I know what they are --

MS. BOLAND: Okay.

THE COURT: -- in terms of the -- the dollars and the money spent and the efforts made for the polling places and that sort of thing. So they did stipulate to that.

MS. BOLAND: And we do have exhibits in the record for your consideration, Your Honor, reflecting all of the bills and all the rosters, having to do with the advertisements. But --

THE COURT: We all believe you.

MS. BOLAND: Okay. But in addition, our witness was going to testify to the harms that would happen if -- if the certification was withheld. So if the certification --

1 THE COURT: Well, tell me, what harms would result 2 if the certification is withheld? 3 MS. BOLAND: So if the certification is withheld 4 and the public learns about this, this could drive their --5 this is one of many harms, but this could drive their 6 behavior. This is an equitable proceeding. We have to 7 consider all -- all of these potential harms to the --8 9 10 11 12 this particular ballot question? 13 14 THE COURT: 15 it's there, then what will -- they'll know. 16 17 THE COURT: 18 opinion. 19 (Laughter.) 20 21 22

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THE COURT: Counsel, I'm a Commonwealth Court Judge, and I didn't know about this amendment until I was assigned this case last week. So, really? Do you really think the public is really paying that close attention to MS. BOLAND: Honestly, Your Honor, I do. And if they go to the polling place and MS. BOLAND: Honestly, Your Honor, I do --The public is not going to read my MS. BOLAND: Well, I do -- I can't testify, Your But I will say that I'm active on social media and I did see posts this week from people I know from high school actually debating this amendment. This morning on the news and last night on the news this preliminary injunction hearing was -- was advertised.

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So, I mean, people are aware. And there are certain people that really do care and are debating -- are actually debating --

THE COURT: And they will get to vote, right, no matter what. That's what the petitioner was saying, they will get to vote.

MS. BOLAND: They --

THE COURT: They're just -- they're just asking for some of these things to be ironed out before it's implemented. That's all I think that they're asking for.

Is that right?

MR. BIZAR: We -- we think that the -- the electorate should have their votes tallied -- tallied in -- in the proper way so that Article XI, Section 1 requirements should be met.

THE COURT: So your --

MR. BIZAR: And obviously the other things that have to be addressed as part of the amendment.

THE COURT: But your concern is that if people think that it might not be actually enacted, they might not vote or show up to the polling place?

MS. BOLAND: Oh, they may not vote. They may not show up. They may come to the polling place and just skip that question. They could fill in a random bubble because they know it's not going to be counted.

And then say at the end of the day we win this -we win this injunction. We can't depend on the reliability
of -- of those votes. We'd have to go back, potentially
spend all of that money again, and redo it.

And that's probably why, Your Honor, no injunction has ever been issued in this context; because if you organically let it go through, you still have a remedy at the end of the day. But if a preliminary injunction is issued now, three weeks ahead of the election, and notices —

THE COURT: What if -- what if 99 percent of the voters voted yes; would you feel that there was harm? What if 96 percent voted yes to this amendment? It's kind of a no-brainer for a voter, isn't it?

MS. BOLAND: That actually isn't true. There is a lot of debate out there over — over whether or not the — the electorate wants this. And we take no position on that, Your Honor. We are here to defend, you know, the technical requirements of the ballot question.

THE COURT: But the fact is if it passes, if -- if the majority of the voters say yes, then -- then you don't have harm because you -- that's -- and people voted for it.

Then we just have to sort through the issues --

MS. BOLAND: But --

THE COURT: -- before it's actually implemented.

MS. BOLAND: But our harm isn't necessarily --

isn't necessarily measured by if the ballot question passes or not. Our harm is whether or not the electorate truly had a chance to vote. So maybe the PI kept all those people that were going to vote no at home. So even though we have a yes answer, that's not our goal necessarily, getting a yes answer. Our goal is getting the electorate to vote and getting the organic vote of — of the electorate. So that's one potential harm.

And, secondly, twenty——— over 20,000 people —— our witness was —— is —— you can take notice of the fact that he was going to testify that over 22,000 people have already voted with absolutely no notice that their vote could be called into question or that a preliminary injunction could possibly be issued where their vote wouldn't be counted.

They waited until the last minute. And, again, this isn't necessarily an anomaly on -- on -- on their part because in all of these cases when a preliminary injunction is denied for whatever reason, petitioners seem to always wait until the ballots are printed.

Here, the ballot question was posted on the Department of State website in July. They've known about the actual amendment for two years, since 2018. But the ballot question was posted in July. They didn't file -- and it was advertised in two newspapers in 67 counties --

THE COURT: I thought I heard that the ballot

1 question was made public on September 11th. That's what I 2 thought I heard earlier. 3 MS. BOLAND: That's -- that's incorrect, Your 4 Honor. What happened on September 11th was -- was the 5 certification of the ballot. So that's -- that's something 6 that's -- that's different. 7 The ballot question itself had been first posted on 8 the Department of State website in July. And then it was 9 advertised in August, September, and in October in all of the 10 67 counties, in two newspapers in all of the 67 counties three months in a row. So the ballot question was on the 11 12 website in July; advertised in August, September, and 13 October. 14 The petitioners didn't file for this injunction in 15 July. The petitioners did not file for this injunction in 16 August. The petitioners did not --17 THE COURT: Can they not file an injunction before it's certified? 18 19 MS. BOLAND: I don't -- there's no -- there's no --20 THE COURT: I couldn't find any --21 MS. BOLAND: -- prohibition --22 THE COURT: I couldn't find any law on whether 23 there's time limits to file an injunction on these ballot 24 questions, so --

MS. BOLAND: I -- I don't -- I'm unaware of any --

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THE COURT: Do you know if there's any law that says they have to wait till it's certified?

MS. BOLAND: Absolutely not, Your Honor. There's no law indicating that they have to wait. And, in fact, all of the case law out there, including the Bergdoll decision, which we got from the clerk's office because it's from back before it was electronic, back — back then, they said, you know, the courts shouldn't have to be weeks and days before the election doing fire drills.

So there -- these cases were on note -- you know, put -- put the petitioners on notice that it's not a good idea to wait until the last minute; that, in fact, the courts do hold that against you because of all the problems that befall waiting until the last minute.

And seemingly, it's perplexing that petitioners in all these cases seem to do that despite the fact that the question was available and this could have been taken care of before 22,000 people, including military — military personnel overseas, cast their vote. But they didn't do that.

So now they want to -- and -- and during -- and the eleventh hour is actually putting it nicely because we're past midnight at this point. Twenty-two thousand people have voted. So now they've waited, and they want us to post notices. They're coming up with some creative resolution --

1 THE COURT: They're not asking for that anymore. 2 Okay. MS. BOLAND: 3 They're not asking for that anymore. THE COURT: 4 So they just don't want us to certify MS. BOLAND: 5 when -- when --6 Right. That's all -- that's all --THE COURT: 7 MS. BOLAND: -- they could have been before ---- they're asking for, right? That's 8 THE COURT: 9 all I've heard. 10 MR. BIZAR: That's right. 11 THE COURT: Okay. 12 MS. BOLAND: But we do believe that greater harm 13 could -- would be caused by an injunction certifying it when 14 they have a remedy later, when all of the cases from this 15 Court have indicated that it is justiciable, there is a 16 remedy later. And that has actually occurred in Bergdoll and 17 in PA Prison Society where the Court later -- later found the 18 amendments unconstitutional. 19 In those cases, the Court did not think it was 20 appropriate to right before the election basically throw --21 throw some kind of wrench in it. So they waited until after 22 the fact and had time to consider the merits, time to 23 consider, like, some of the issues that were raised today, 24 like whether or not the -- it's self-executing or not.

So, you know, that's one of our -- our strongest

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points, Your Honor, that there has never been a PI issued in this — in this situation. And the issuance of a PI, including a certification, would — or withholding the certification would cause greater harm to the Commonwealth, could potentially require us to redo the vote later if we win on the merits when there's a remedy later.

And the status quo is that 22,000 people have already voted and the petitioners are asking you, Judge, to not count their votes, literally. So --

THE COURT: They're not asking us for that.

They're asking us to allow the votes to be considered but just wait until some of the constitutional issues are resolved. That's what they're asking. We're balancing harms here.

So is the harm 22,000 people who have cast their vote or is it the criminal justice system and the rights that are provided to accused and whatnot now suddenly up in the air, and folks that will be in jail for who knows how long or be submitting guilty pleas, or victims who will not know, you know, exactly what's going to happen to them and what they need to show up -- and I don't see anything where there's going to be resources to -- to add to the already completely overburdened criminal justice system.

So what are we going to weigh here? Are we going to weigh 22,000 votes, or are we going to look at the entire

criminal justice system in our state?

MS. BOLAND: A couple of points, Your Honor. We do have to look at the 22,000 votes, but really we're looking at this point in time to the harm to -- to the election generally.

At this moment in time, if -- if anything, withholding the certification could cast a pall over the integrity of the election and can -- could drive voter behavior. So that's an immediate harm. And -- and as far as --

THE COURT: That's speculative. You're -- that's a speculative argument you're making. You have no idea.

MS. BOLAND: Well, we could also put our witness up, Your Honor, and he could testify as to his experience in terms of confusion at the polls --

THE COURT: But we're not going to be --

MS. BOLAND: -- when some last-minute change is --

THE COURT: We're not going to be asking for -they're not asking for last-minute changes.

MS. BOLAND: I understand that, Your Honor. But the issuance of a PI at all, and -- the issuance of PI at all will cause confusion.

But as to the other -- the burdens on the criminal justice system, in Grimaud, there were similar concerns.

That had to do with bail. That -- in Grimaud, they -- the

proposed amendment did two different things. On one hand, it expanded the capital offenses. But on the other hand, it said basically, We can withhold bail if we think that no reasonable safeguard will prevent you from harming the community.

And in that case, the defense bar was up in arms because before, it was just certain limited offenses that, you know, you could be denied bail for but now it was this wishy-washy standard about whether or not you were considered a threat; could be withhold -- you know, in that case, you could withhold bail.

And in Grimaud, the defense bar was totally up in arms about that and made similar arguments that they're making today: Well, that takes away the presumption of innocence. That means that people now might be sitting in — in a jail cell. And they can't defend themselves. They can't consult with counsel. They're presumed to be bad people because if — if — you know, if the judge decides that they're going to hurt someone, well, there goes our presumption of innocence.

These are almost the same harms that are coming up in this case. The preliminary injunction was denied there, and there was no evidence that this change at all created some really heavy burden on the criminal justice system.

And in this case, we have the Crime Victims' Rights

Amendment. In every county, you are going to have a victims' advocate. It already provides that victims be notified. It already provides that they be heard. It already provides that they be considered in pretrial disposition.

THE COURT: Well, why are you putting this into the Constitution then?

MS. BOLAND: I am not the General Assembly, Your Honor. I can't speak to -- speak to their motive, but my -- my thought is that they want to enshrine these very important rights for -- for victims.

It's worked out in this Commonwealth. We've had the Bill of Rights for those victims. It's been in place since 1998. There's been no testimony, no studies, no data that that has caused any direct — any sort of havoc in Pennsylvania. And so this just goes a step further and enshrines basically what's already there.

But those same concerns were present in Grimaud when a PI was also denied in that case. Same sort of thing, maybe even worse; you're going to have people sitting in jail because it's just presumed they're bad people.

But -- and they brought in no evidence about -- there -- Mr. Greenblatt was mostly speculating about his interpretations and what he thinks. He admitted he -- he didn't bring in any studies or data or reports. So --

THE COURT: He's boots on the ground. He knows how

it works on the front lines. I mean --

MS. BOLAND: That's fair.

THE COURT: That's --

MS. BOLAND: That's fair. But there is more to be seen yet with this -- with this amendment.

And -- and the short term harm in terms of the electorate, in terms of the vote already cast when there's just no burning need because at the end of the day, they can still get the relief they seek.

And, you know, one of the -- the main points they try to make is infringing on the right to vote. Twenty-two thousand people have already voted. So the harm is there. That at best cancels each other -- cancels each other out in terms of their -- of their harm because the 22,000 people who have already voted will be harmed if their votes aren't certified. The people that are heading to the polls who are going to be confused about whether or not their vote will count if certification is withheld, their right to vote will be harmed.

So, Your Honor, for those reasons -- for those reasons, you know, the PI isn't necessary.

And just very quickly on the Costa case, counsel mentioned that that's a creative resolution. Now, again, Costa does not provide for withholding the certification. They've produced no case law, no precedent supporting that

withholding the certification is at all a proper remedy.

And, in fact, withholding the certification appears to

directly contradict the Election Code which is another harm

on -- on our side.

But in addition, in Costa, everybody agreed that that ballot question was not going forward. It was dead. It was dead. It was over. And that is a huge distinction here because the General Assembly was going --

THE COURT: Was that the judges' retirement?

MR. BIZAR: Yes, Your Honor.

MS. BOLAND: Yes, Your Honor. Yes.

So everyone agreed that that question was dead; that was the end of it. We don't have that situation here. This question could live on. So the Costa case is just completely different and is distinguishable because it had already been decided that the question — the question was dead. So I just wanted to briefly reiterate that point.

And then turning quickly back to the merits, Your Honor, Grimaud does apply. In Grimaud, the Court finally adopted the standard to apply in these types of cases. I have in quotes it adopted a subject matter focus in which the Court determines whether alterations are interrelated.

I already discussed with you, Your Honor, the implicit acknowledgement that an amendment can have parts which is the whole point of the standard to determine if

those parts are interrelated. Simply because it has parts or semicolons or is bulky doesn't render it per se unconstitutional. The test to be used is the common-purpose formulation. Here, every single part, whether we like them or not, relates to one purpose which is securing victims' rights in the criminal —

THE COURT: And whether it facially or patently or substantially affects other constitutional amendments; not just related. But — and as you know, the petitioners went through an entire analysis of every constitutional amendment they thought that it facially, patently, and substantially affected. So not just whether it's interrelated.

MS. BOLAND: That's true, Your Honor. The interrelated is the first part of the test, and I think -- I think you've heard enough from me about that.

But as to the facial -- the facial aspect of it, the test is very clear. The petitioners are trying to rework the test or to advance their interpretation of the test. But it's pretty straightforward. The test is that it must facially affect other parts of the Constitution. Stated another way in the case, patently affects other constitutional provisions. Not, not whether it implicitly has such an effect.

In Grimaud, just as here, the petitioners were arguing about that new safety exception, like I said, Your

Honor, with -- for the bail and saying, Well, that -- that implicitly impacts the right to defend yourself and the presumption of innocence and the right against excessive bail. And the Court literally said because the language of those rights was the same prior to the amendment as after the amendment, literally the language was the same, their argument failed.

I think the Court really strived to make clear that it meant literally facially change other parts of the Constitution. That's why it said not whether it implicitly has such an effect. And despite the case saying that, the petitioners are still arguing that it implicitly has that effect, just like they did in Grimaud. And — and that's just simply not the standard. The standard couldn't be any more clear from the Supreme Court.

This amendment only adds a provision. It does not -- excuse me -- delete any existing language. It's not like Bergdoll. In Bergdoll, on one hand, it deleted -- literally deleted the face-to-face requirement on one hand and on the other added something new. We don't have that here. It didn't delete any part of any other constitutional amendment. So their argument under the standard just is unavailing. It doesn't facially alter any other parts.

And because of that, Your Honor, because the -- the parts of the amendment are interrelated and work towards the

same common purpose, which is the test, it satisfies that aspect of Grimaud. And because it doesn't facially affect any other provisions, meaning it doesn't delete, it doesn't supplant any language, it satisfies the other part too. So for that reason, Your Honor, they can't show a clear right to relief on the merits.

And the same goes for their other two arguments. They didn't get into it. I'll just quickly say that as to the full text, even they admit in their brief that the Supreme Court has allowed a summary to go on the ballot. And they are requesting — they're arguing a change in the law. So that's as to the full text. And they certainly can't have a clear right to relief if they're arguing for a change in — in the law.

And -- and finally, the question and -- does fairly apprise the standard. It's a very high bar to strike down a ballot question. It has to be just woefully inadequate. The standard is that it has to be so lacking and so confusing that voters can't intelligently express their intentions.

Here, that's -- that's not the case. The -- the ballot question literally takes direct quotes and covers a lot of -- of the amendment. So, Your Honor, for those reasons, they don't have a clear right to relief on the merits.

And finally, Your Honor, I just want to close in

saying that it's against the public interest to issue an injunction in case. It encourages petitioners, like the petitioners in this case, to wait until ballots are printed inexplicably when they had notice till — until July and to potentially disrupt an election when they could have done this before.

It hurts the public because 22,000 votes may not be -- may not be counted or certified after they were already cast. That is a true harm. That is a true infringement on the right to vote, after your vote has already been cast, someone taking that away from you, where on the other hand, they can get their relief if they -- if -- if this Court so decides that's appropriate later on without potentially throwing a big wrench and jeopardizing the election.

THE COURT: Okay.

MS. BOLAND: Thank you, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Thank you kindly.

Mr. Withers, if you could, you know, just touch on new -- new issues and not repeat, I'd appreciate it.

MR. WITHERS: Thank you, Your Honor. I will do so.

First, Your Honor, thank you for the privilege of being here today. The -- my clients, the intervenors on behalf of Marsy's Law, are very appreciative of the expedited consideration that was given to the intervention application that ultimately provided the intervenors the opportunity to

be here today, and we thank the Court for that, first of all.

THE COURT: And the petitioners agreed too.

MR. WITHERS: Yes, they did.

I'd like to address your question about restitution that was given to my colleague. The Pennsylvania Crime Code's sentencing provisions already require full restitution. I would cite you to 18 Pa.C.S. Section 1106(a). That statute requiring full restitution has been challenged repeatedly and upheld as constitutional.

Commonwealth versus Burwell, 58 A.3d 790. That's a Pennsylvania Superior Court case in 2012. And while there have been claims that requiring full restitution could be a violation of a defendant's due process rights, that argument has been rejected. Commonwealth versus Ortiz, 854 A.2d 1280. That's PA Superior Court 2004. Those cites are in our brief at page 28.

Your Honor, on the question of irreparable harm, which is the first of the six elements of the injunction that must be shown by petitioners in this case, intervenors respectfully submit that as a matter of law, you cannot find immediate and irreparable harm in this case. And let me tell you why.

Mr. Greenblatt's testimony in this matter was nothing but pure speculation on what he thinks might happen and how the courts might rule. The harm that has been

identified by Mr. Bizar was the harm to the electorate's rights to vote separately. Okay.

If you do not enjoin certification of the ballot question, that claim will not be irreparably lost. There will be no toothpaste that comes out of the tube that cannot be put back in if you don't issue an injunction here.

Let's look at Grimaud and Bergdoll. In Grimaud, the declaration sought from the Commonwealth Court was that the amendments to the PA Constitution that had been adopted by the electorate could be rendered invalid.

In Bergdoll, the residents of Pennsylvania filed a petition for review with the Commonwealth Court, seeking to void amendments that were passed. This Court does not need to stop the election — the elective process to ultimately give petitioners relief.

If this Court or the Supreme Court, after a full hearing on the merits, a full trial on the merits, or maybe through the summary relief procedures of Chapter 15 of the Rules of Appellate Procedure or review by the Supreme Court — if it is ultimately determined that there is something infirm in this constitutional amendment and that it violates the single subject rule, then it can be rendered invalid.

And for there -- that very reason, there cannot be irreparable harm here as a matter of law. They cannot get

past the first prong of the injunction test. There will be no irreparable harm in this case. The denial of an injunction here does not preclude the ultimate relief they seek on the merits after the election.

As to the merits on the single subject question, in intervenors' brief, we have done an exhaustive analysis of the 15 clauses in Section (a) of the proposed Article I, Section 9 where we've separated out each one of those clauses and in intricate detail articulate to the Court why they do not facially or patently affect other pages of the Constitution.

I would direct you to our brief at pages 16-35 for that analysis. And I know you -- we've had a lot of discussion about the merits, and I'm not going to belabor that point.

As to laches, the petitioners have argued that laches is inappropriate here because there's a constitutional question. And they've cited to the case of Taurig (ph) back in the '30s. First of all, Taurig (ph) --

THE COURT: Have you come up with any law that has a time limit for challenging these ballot questions?

MR. WITHERS: I am not aware of a law that prevents a time limit. But the argument I'm making is no -- is not a statutory argument. It's an equitable argument. They are here seeking preliminary injunctive relief; and, therefore,

laches does apply.

And I would submit to this Court that the per--that the denial of a permanent injunction, injunction on the
basis of laches would be improper and violate the precedents
of this Court. But we are here not on a permanent
injunction. We are here on a preliminary injunction. And
laches should not -- should be a bar to a case in -- in that
matter for all of the reasons articulated by my colleague at
the end of her argument.

This is not a request that laches bar their request for ultimate relief. But on a preliminary basis, it's absolutely an issue in this case; how long they've known about this matter, how they've sat on their hands and not done anything and come into court and caused us to have a fire drill. That's — that's truly what this is. And — and for those reasons also, this should be denied.

Our brief fully sets forth the remaining arguments.

The one thing that hasn't been touched on and is curiously absent from the petitioners' proposed orders in this Court is any mention of the bond that would be required to — to support injunction in this matter.

Under the Rules of Civil Procedure 1531(b), no injunction can be entered by this Court without a bond that covers all of the expenses undertaken by the Commonwealth if it's later determined that that injunction was improperly

entered.

The bond that would have to be posted in this matter to support a preliminary injunction would be momentous. And I wanted to point that out. Any injunction entered without a bond, where a bond is not paid, is automatically void ab initio and doesn't even require an appeal.

It's an absolute requirement of the preliminary injunction law, incorporated under the petition for review rules by Rule 106, and that is Rule 1531 Civil.

And for those reasons and mainly for the reason that as a matter of law, there is no immediate and irreparable harm in this case, intervenors respectfully request that the injunction request for preliminary injunction be denied with prejudice.

Thank you, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Thank you.

Does somebody want to address the bond issue?

MR. BIZAR: We're -- we're checking that, Your Honor. But I'm pretty sure it doesn't apply in a constitutional challenge like this one. So --

THE COURT: Because that -- if it does and if you lost later on --

MR. BIZAR: We'd have to deal with that.

THE COURT: -- it's millions and millions of

dollars.

MR. BIZAR: Well, bonds are usually not -- yeah, we'd have to -- we could submit on that, Your Honor, if you like. And we'd be happy to do that.

So there were pretty mean-spirited -- a couple of mean-spirited remarks, but I want to just come back to one point. If laches were a bar to a preliminary injunction in a constitutional challenge, then --

THE COURT: You know, I --

MR. BIZAR: -- I would think that the respondents would have a case for that. But the Tausig case says it's not.

THE COURT: Right.

MR. BIZAR: And that --

THE COURT: I don't think --

MR. BIZAR: Okay.

THE COURT: -- we have to address that.

MR. BIZAR: Fine.

THE COURT: I think both sides have addressed that.

MR. BIZAR: I want to come back to the -- the issue of enjoining certification. We cited a -- a case, Westerfelt (ph), which is from Kentucky. It's a Kentucky Supreme Court case. We cited that case in our papers for the proposition that the Secretary's ballot question did not adequately apprise the voters of the issue.

THE COURT: By the way, the Supreme Court was 1 2 looking to other jurisdictions for guidance. Usually it's 3 not -- you know, because there's so little law on this --4 MR. BIZAR: Right. 5 THE COURT: -- that they did look --6 MR. BIZAR: Right. 7 THE COURT: So -- so I forgot to ask this question. 8 You -- you just said that it's caused -- wreaked havoc and 9 have been problems in other states. What states and what's 10 happened? 11 MR. BIZAR: So they're in our -- the citations to the articles that report on that are in our primary brief. 12 13 THE COURT: So one state was \$660,000 in --14 MR. BIZAR: Yes. 15 THE COURT: All right. Well --16 MR. BIZAR: We -- we don't know what the record is 17 on the costs that would be imposed on the system. But I 18 would say this: the Crime Victims Act is not a good proxy 19 for what's going to happen if this amendment were to be passed because the Crime Victims Act is not coterminous with 20 21 the rights that are afforded to victims in the -- in the --22 Marsy's Law. 23 THE COURT: You're repeating yourself right now. 24 MR. BIZAR: Okay.

THE COURT: I think that you folks really need to

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1
    look at this bond issue.
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              MR. BIZAR: We will. We will.
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              THE COURT: I'm sure Ms. Haw doesn't want to be on
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    the hook for $4 million or something.
 5
              MR. BIZAR: No. I understand.
              THE COURT: Or three million or whatever it is.
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 7
              MR. BIZAR: And I -- I certainly don't either.
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              THE COURT: Yeah.
 9
              MR. CHRISTY: Your Honor, although I don't have
10
    any --
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              MR. BIZAR:
                          Stand.
12
              MR. CHRISTY: Oh, pardon me. Thank you.
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              Although I don't have any case to cite at the
14
    moment, the ACLU has gotten many injunctions in this court
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    and in other courts in the state without having to post a
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    bond.
17
              THE COURT:
                         All right.
18
              MR. CHRISTY: And we'll certainly be happy to -- to
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    brief that for you, Your Honor.
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              THE COURT: Please do.
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              MR. BIZAR: We'll brief it immediately, Your Honor.
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              THE COURT: Yes.
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              MR. BIZAR: But I want to go back to this Kentucky
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    case that we cited for another proposition, Westerfelt (ph).
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              THE COURT:
                          Wester- -- yes.
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MR. BIZAR: In that -- in that case, the Kentucky
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    -- the trial court enjoined certification, the tabulation and
 3
    certification of the election results, and the Supreme Court
 4
    ruled that Marsy's Law was unconstitutional.
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              THE COURT:
                          The Supreme Court of Kentucky?
              MR. BIZAR: Kentucky. So 22,000 votes that --
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              THE COURT: Was that -- was that amendment as
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    complex as this one?
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              MR. BIZAR: Very similar, Your Honor.
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              THE COURT: Very similar?
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              MR. BIZAR: There's a standard template that
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    they're using across the country.
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              Ms. Boland talks about the 22,000 votes.
                                                         Those
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    22,000 votes, or others, those would only be counted if we --
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    if we were not to prevail, they would be counted. They would
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    only not be counted if we were to prevail. In other words,
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    if we win --
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              THE COURT: I understand.
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              MR. BIZAR: -- they don't get counted. So --
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              THE COURT: Right.
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              MR. BIZAR: If -- if they -- if we prevail, there
22
    was no right to vote at all, so there's no
23
    disenfranchisement.
24
              Pennsylvania voters have no right to vote on a
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ballot question that's not constitutionally proper.

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doesn't matter that they already voted in that instance.

But if they -- if we fail, if we're -- if we're unsuccessful, the votes are there; they'll be counted. No one will lose their vote. The only way there would be disenfranchisement, Your Honor, is if voters who would have voted for separate amendments --

THE COURT: Yeah. Now you're just kind of repeating yourself --

MR. BIZAR: Okay.

THE COURT: -- at this point. You've made those arguments quite clearly to me. Anything new?

MR. BIZAR: There was a lot of speculation in what we heard from Ms. Boland. What if the voters stay home because they like some of the amendments from Marsy's Law and not others? That's equally speculation. The point is we just don't know what's going to happen.

We know that the ballot question looks like this or the ballot -- the ballots look like this. (Indicating.)

This is going to be one of the exhibits. It's the Cumberland County official municipal ballot. And there are many that are similar. This is what will be on the screens in the -- in the voting booths. And there -- they'll be part of the record that you have.

THE COURT: Speaking of this, how are we going to make a record as to what has been moved into evidence?

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MR. BIZAR: We'll do that right after we're done with the argument, Your Honor, if that's all right with you.

THE COURT: All right.

MR. BIZAR: Lots of questions. Not just the ballot question. There are 13 other contested issues on this ballot, and that's true for many of the other counties. So voters — there's absolutely no showing by Mr. Marks, by anybody that voters will stay home for this point.

Now, we -- we heard about the -- the 1967 bulk amendments. I want to talk about that, Your Honor. I haven't really addressed that.

The 1967 bulk amendments were part of a process that was leading up to a constitutional convention. So the posture was completely different than the posture here.

THE COURT: That's what created this Court.

MR. BIZAR: Yes, among other things.

THE COURT: Right.

MR. BIZAR: And those bulk amendments in 1967 were never challenged. So there was no opinion on it of whether it was proper under Article XI, Section 1 or not. There just wasn't a challenge.

The -- for the 1960s issue, those bulk amendments, it's no -- there's no dispute here that the proper test is -- the current framework is set forth in Grimaud and Bergdoll. Your Honor acknowledged it. Respondents and we do not

disagree about that. We just disagree about how that test works.

And we've set that all forth in our papers, but the point is from our perspective, there is not a common objective or a common purpose. These parts are not sufficiently interrelated and connected to -- to achieve that.

And that's not a question of colons or the fact that the ballot question has one question mark. It's — it's looking at the substance of the amendment and applying it to the Constitution which is what the Court is entrusted to do in this process.

Bergdoll, PA Prison Society, all those cases had less sweeping changes than the changes we had here. And so the injunctions that were denied in those cases, to the extent they were, it's a different context. And these have to be fact-by-fact decisions -- or case-by-case decisions. There has never been an amendment like this, ever.

THE COURT: How about those bulk amendments?

MR. BIZAR: Leading to the Constitutional

Convention. A completely different situation and not challenged at the time.

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. BIZAR: We'll address the bond issue right away.

1 THE COURT: Okay. 2 So did you need to respond to anything that was --3 or we can be done? 4 MS. BOLAND: Just very quickly, Your Honor. 5 THE COURT: Very quickly. MS. BOLAND: I can stand -- stand from the table. 6 7 THE COURT: Anything that we haven't gone over. 8 MS. BOLAND: Yep. Just the Westerfield Kentucky case that -- that petitioners cited is completely different. 9 10 It was based upon different language in the Kentucky 11 Constitution. The Kentucky Constitution required that the 12 full amendment be put in the ballot question. That's why it 13 was struck down. Totally different situation. 14 THE COURT: And our -- and Pennsylvania's -- it's 15 -- the law is interesting on that. But that was the reason? 16 MS. BOLAND: That was the reason, Your Honor. 17 THE COURT: Okay. 18 MR. BIZAR: Your Honor, it's a completely incorrect 19 statement. There's only two words' difference between the 20 Kentucky Constitution and the Pennsylvania Constitution. 21 It's almost identical. 22 THE COURT: Well, I will definitely look at those 23 much more closely. 24 Counsel, thank you for your great arguments, your

great advocacy today. I understand how important this is to

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1 everybody, so I will do my best to get an order out in the 2 next couple days. But I won't necessarily get an opinion out 3 until maybe a week or so because there's a lot of issues for 4 me to think about and -- and some additional issues that I 5 need to research after today. But I would appreciate the 6 bond quickly. 7 MR. BIZAR: We'll have that in very quickly, Your 8 Honor. 9 THE COURT: So thank you all very much. I hope the 10 gallery enjoyed the argument. And it was -- it was a 11 privilege having to hear this case as well. 12 MR. BIZAR: Thank you for your courtesy. 13 THE COURT: Okay. 14 THE COURT CRIER: Commonwealth Court is now 15 adjourned. 16 MR. WITHERS: Your Honor, if I may, I'm sorry --17 sorry to interrupt, but we still have not had a discussion on 18 the record regarding the evidence. 19 THE COURT: Right. Can -- can -- I'll just wait back there. Can you just agree on everything or --20 21 MR. WITHERS: I don't believe we can just agree on 22 everything, Your Honor. I think we --23 THE COURT: I mean, you gave --24 MR. WITHERS: I think the record needs to reflect

25

what the record --

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1
              THE COURT: Okay.
 2
              MR. WITHERS: The record made today needs to
 3
    reflect --
 4
              THE COURT: I'll sit here while --
 5
              MR. WITHERS: -- what the evidentiary record is.
 6
              THE COURT: -- while you go through the exhibits
 7
    and make a record. And then you'll go through the exhibits,
 8
    and we'll be sure that the record is complete.
 9
              MR. WITHERS: Thank you, Your Honor.
10
              THE COURT: For everyone here, it's going to be
11
    very dull from this point. So -- but you're welcome to stay,
12
    of course.
13
              MR. BIZAR: So, Your Honor, petitioner offers
14
    Plaintiffs' Exhibit -- or Petitioners' Exhibit -- sorry; I
15
    slipped there -- P-1 through P-10.
16
              THE COURT: Thank you for reminding me, counsel, by
17
    the way.
18
              MR. WITHERS:
                            Yes.
19
              THE COURT: Mr. Wisler, is it?
20
              MR. WITHERS:
                            Withers.
21
              THE COURT: Thank you for reminding me.
22
              MR. WITHERS: Thank you, Your Honor.
23
              THE COURT: Okay. All right. So let's go through
24
    the exhibits.
25
              MR. BIZAR:
                         P-1.
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1
              MS. BOLAND: No objection.
 2
              MR. BIZAR: You're good with all --
 3
              MS. BOLAND:
                          I --
 4
              MR. BIZAR:
                         -- all ten?
 5
              MS. BOLAND: We don't --
              MR. BIZAR:
                          Okay. P-1 --
 6
 7
              MS. BOLAND: We don't object.
 8
              MR. BIZAR: -- through P-10.
 9
              MS. BOLAND: Yes.
              THE COURT: P-1 through P-10? All right. You're
10
11
    not going to name each one then. All right.
12
              MR. BIZAR: I can.
13
              THE COURT: No, you don't have to.
14
              MR. BIZAR: There -- there's a table, Your Honor,
15
    in the book. So you'll have them.
16
              THE COURT: And these were submitted as part of
17
    your petition and your brief and your injunction?
18
              MR. BIZAR: And today.
19
              THE COURT: All right. So it's all part of the
20
    record?
21
              MR. BIZAR: Yes.
22
              THE COURT: All right.
23
              MS. BOLAND: Your Honor, we would like -- we have
24
    22 exhibits. We agree we stipulate as to all of them except
25
    for statements as to the ACLU. And Mr. Withers can take up
```

1 that argument. 2 THE COURT: Statement as to the ACLU? 3 MS. BOLAND: Mr. Withers, did you want to cover 4 that point? 5 MR. WITHERS: Your Honor, in the answer of the 6 intervenors to the injunction for -- the petition -- the 7 application for a preliminary injunction, we cited to four 8 press releases and memorandums type documents. One of them 9 was the October 10th I believe statement of the League of 10 Women Voters which is Exhibit --11 THE COURT: Would you have any objections to the press releases and whatnot not being included because, I 12 13 mean, I just -- they're not really evidence necessarily. 14 MR. WITHERS: They go to laches, Your Honor, and 15 knowledge. 16 MR. BIZAR: So let me just for the record -- and 17 you can overrule this if you like, Your Honor; there are four 18 Three involve the ACLU. One involves the League of items. 19 Women Voters. League of Women Voters item is Exhibit G, or 20 21. 21 THE COURT: And that's the one that you want to 22 be --23 That's --MR. BIZAR: 24 MR. WITHERS: That's the one that there -- I do not 25 believe there's a dispute --

1 MR. BIZAR: That's correct.

2 THE COURT: Okay.

MR. BIZAR: That's the press release by the League of Women Voters.

THE COURT: All right.

MR. BIZAR: Let's be very clear that the League of Women Voters is the petitioner here, not the ACLU. The ACLU is counsel. So we don't have an objection to the petitioner's statement about this lawsuit which was filed the day that the lawsuit — or submitted the day — posted the day that the lawsuit was filed.

The other three documents are documents by the ACLU that relate to the legislative process by which Marsy's Law, or the Crime Victims' Rights Amendment, was adopted. The Exhibit E, or Exhibit 19, in petitioners' -- sorry; in respondent's -- respondent's volume is an ACLU statement from April 8th, '19; 2019.

Exhibit F, or Number 20, is an ACLU statement from June 20th, 2019. And Exhibit H is a memo from the ACLU to the PA House, Pennsylvania House, on June 12th, 2019.

With respect to that which is tab 22 in the respondent's volume of exhibits, there is no laches argument that could even possibly apply to that statement because that statement was submitted to the House before the bill, before the amendment went through its second vote. It has to go

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1
    through two votes at the Legislature before it becomes a
 2
    joint resolution that can be enacted. So it's just a
 3
    lobbying piece by the ACLU which is not a petitioner.
 4
              THE COURT: So then you have --
 5
              MR. BIZAR: So there's no laches.
 6
              THE COURT: -- no objections to it being excluded
 7
    from evidence?
 8
              MR. BIZAR: I -- I think it should be excluded from
 9
    evidence.
10
              THE COURT: Okay. Counsel?
              MR. BIZAR: They're offering it.
11
12
              THE COURT: All right. It's excluded. You're --
13
    you're --
14
              MR. WITHERS: I'm not asking it be excluded, Your
15
            I'm asking it be admitted. They are opposing.
    Honor.
16
              THE COURT: Oh, you're asking it to be admitted.
17
              MR. WITHERS: Yes. Those documents --
18
              THE COURT: I'm sorry.
              MR. WITHERS: It -- it's a little confusing because
19
20
    of the four exhibits, Your Honor. And I apologize if I did
21
    not fully explain myself, and that's probably why you're
22
    confused.
23
              The position of the intervenors is that the ACLU
24
    and the League of Women Voters, who have been working
25
    together on this case -- and we don't know how long because
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1
    Ms. Haw and the League of Women Voters representative didn't
 2
    testify today; but those --
 3
              THE COURT: Oh, that's why you want it for laches.
 4
    I see.
 5
              MR. WITHERS: And -- and it -- it goes to --
              THE COURT: Laches.
 6
 7
              MR. WITHERS: It goes to notice and knowledge.
 8
    We're not asking it for the truth of the matters asserted in
 9
    those documents. We're -- we're asking that it be noticed by
10
    -- by this Court for their knowledge that this process was
    going on and their failure to act. And that's the reason
11
    we're seeking to have it admitted.
12
13
              THE COURT: I'll allow it be admitted and give it
14
    the consideration it deserves. Okay?
15
              MR. BIZAR:
                         Okay, Your Honor. But would that apply
16
    to all three then, to all three --
17
              THE COURT: Yes. Yes.
18
              MR. BIZAR: Okay. Fine.
19
              THE COURT: I mean, I'll look at it, and I'll apply
20
    it to the whole theory of --
21
              MR. BIZAR:
                         Right.
22
              THE COURT: All right. So --
23
              MR. WITHERS: Your Honor --
24
              THE COURT: -- folks --
25
              MR. WITHERS: -- finally, I have one more thing,
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1 and that will be it. 2 THE COURT: Oh, do you? 3 MR. WITHERS: Yes. Appended to the brief of the 4 petitioners are several newspaper articles. They haven't 5 sought to admit those newspaper articles into evidence here. 6 All of them are -- are classic hearsay. They go to the --7 THE COURT: News articles are not -- don't worry; 8 they're not evidence. 9 MR. WITHERS: They're not evidence. And so -- but 10 they are part of the brief. They've been attached to the 11 brief of the petitioners. And I would just like to make sure 12 that we note for the record that they will not be considered 13 as evidence of the harms that could occur in this case. 14 THE COURT: Absolutely not. 15 MR. WITHERS: Thank you, Your Honor. 16 THE COURT: I mean absolutely what you're saying. 17 MR. WITHERS: I have nothing further, Your Honor. 18 THE COURT: Okay. All right. Thank you, 19 everybody. 20 Thank you, Your Honor. MS. BOLAND: 21 MR. BIZAR: Thank you, Your Honor. 22 THE COURT CRIER: Commonwealth Court is now 23 adjourned. 24 (Whereupon, the proceedings adjourned at 25 11:31 a.m.)

I hereby certify that the proceedings and evidence are contained fully and accurately in the notes taken by me on the proceedings of the above cause and that this copy is a correct transcript of the same. DATED: October 29, 2019 Rebecca Toner, RPR (The foregoing certification of this transcript does not apply to any reproduction of the same by any means unless under the direct control and/or supervision of the certifying reporter.)